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CONTROLLING ANTICOMPETITIVE
BEHAVIOUR IN CANADA:
A CONTRAST TO THE UNITED STATES
By M.T. MACCRIMMON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Canadian and American competition rules address the same types of col-
lusive or exclusionary anticompetitive behaviour. The purpose of this article is
to discuss some of the similarities and differences of these laws. The first sec-
tion of the paper will outline briefly the Canadian legislation. Following that,
the discussion of the rules of the two countries is divided into two parts: ad-
ministration and enforcement, and substantive application of the rules.
Three themes underlying the discussion are judicial methodology,
legislative reform, and economic structure. First, Canadian judicial decisions
reflect a mechanical judicial methodology which relies on conceptual analysis
and ignores the role of legal rules as a means of effecting the ends of the
legislation.' In particular, there is an unwillingness by both judges and counsel
© Copyright, 1983, M.T. MacCrimmon
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of British Columbia. I am in-
debted to W.T. Stanbury, Malcolm Smith and David Cohen for their helpful com-
ments. I am also grateful to the Law and Economics Program at the University of
Chicago Law School for creating a stimulating environment for study and research dur-
ing my stay as a fellow in 1981-82.
1 See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, (1908), 8 Colum. L. Rev. 605; and White,
Tort Law In America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) at 71; Dewees, "The
Courts and Economic Regulation" in Freidland, Courts and Trials: A Multidisciplinary
Approach, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975) at 119; Weiler, Court of Last
Resort (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1974). The attitude of Canadian courts towards
economic evidence is changing. See R. v. Consumers Glass (1981), 57 C.P.R. (2d) 1
(Ont. S.C.). However, the following statement in 1942 in R. v. Container Materials
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to consider the economic rationale for controlling anticompetitive behaviour
and to consider the underlying intent of Parliament in adopting the legislation.
Hence judges have been reluctant to give a purposive reading to the provisions
of the principal Canadian legislation, the Combines Investigation Act. 2 Four
recent decisions of the Supreme Court which have made some of the provi-
sions virtually unenforceable were partly the result of a failure to appreciate
the economic impact of the activities.3 In contrast, in the United States, the
courts, which have not been reluctant to consider economic evidence, have
taken the broad provisions of the Sherman Act and developed specific rules
against anticompetitive conduct.4 These decisions have effectively curbed ac-
tivities such as price fixing, market sharing agreements, and monopolization.
The second theme is legislative reform. Since the early 1970s there have
been several unsuccessful attempts to legislate changes to competition law in
Canada. 5 Critics have abandoned any expectation that effective competition
laws will evolve through the process of adjudication, particularly in the light of
the recent decisions of the Supreme Court. The latest official public reform
proposal was made in the spring of 1981 by the Minister of Consumer and
Corporate Affairs. 6 Although it appears that this attempt at reform has failed,
discussion of the proposals will aid in understanding Canada's approach to
It is well for the Court to avoid even the suspicion of political bias but rather to
leave to the statesmen and the economist, the decision as to what modifications of
the law, indeed if any, are in the public interest... I do not feel that I am justified
in the circumstances of this case, in developing any new jurisprudence based on
alleged new or fashionable economic theory[.]2 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23 as amended by 1970, c. 10 (1st Supp.), s. 34; 1970, c. 10 (2nd
Supp.), s. 65; 1974-75-76, c. 76.
3R.*v. K.C. IrvingLtd. (1977), 32 C.C.C. (2d) 1, 72 D.L.R. (3d) 82 (S.C.C.). Aet-
na Insurance Co. et al v. R. (1977), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 157, 30 C.P.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.C.).
Atlantic Sugar Refineries Co. Ltd. et al. v. R. (1980), 54 C.C.C. (2d) 373, 115 D.L.R.
(3d) (S.C.C.). Jabour v. The Law Society of British Columbia (1979), 98 D.L.R. (3d)
442 (B.C.S.C.), (1981), 115 D.L.R. (3d) 549 (B.C.C.A.), (1982) 5 W.W.R. 289
(S.C.C.).
4 ShermanAct, (1890), 26 Stat. 209, (1974) as am. 15 U.S.C.A. s. 2.
5 See Stanbury, Business Interests and the Reform of Canadian Competition
Policy, 1971-1975 (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1977); Prichard, Stanbury and Wilson
(eds.) Canadian Competition Policy: Essays in Law, Economics (Toronto: Butter-
worths, 1979). Attempts at reform since 1969 are: Bill C-256, 1971; Stage I, Bill C-227,
1973-75; Stage II, 1976-78; Bill C-42, 1976-77; Bill C-13, 1977-78. In 1976, some amend-
ments were adopted. See Canada, Bureau of Competition Policy, Background Papers:
Stage , Competition Policy (Ottawa: Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs,
1976) and Kaiser, "The Stage I Amendments", in Prichard, et al., supra, at 25.
6 Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, "Proposals for Amending the
Combines Investigation Act: A Framework for Discussion" (Ottawa: Dept. of Con-
sumer and Corporate Affairs, April, 1981, mimeo 22 pp.). See Stanbury and Reschen-
thaler, Reforming Canadian Competition Policy (1980-81), 5 Can. Bus. L.J. 381. While
this is the latest official public proposal, draft legislation was prepared following the
Minister's proposals which was never introduced. Its contents have not been revealed to
the general public although the government has shown parts of the draft legislation to a
selected group of business representatives including representatives from the Canadian
Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian Manufacturers' Association and the Business
Council on National Issues. It is possible to glean some of the contents of the draft
legislation from an article by Linda McQuaig in Maclean's Magazine, July 18, 1983,
"Ottawa's Cautious Competition Bill." A more complete summary of the draft legisla-
tion is contained in: Ottawa Revises Combines Law Reform Proposals (1983), 4 Can.
Comp. Policy Record 3. Subsequent notes will point out the differences between the
Minister's 1981 proposals and the draft legislation.
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competition policy.7 The Canadian reliance on Parliament to initiate reform
may be contrasted to the United States, where many rule changes have evolved
largely without legislative change. For instance, it is expected that the 1982
Department of Justice Guidelines on Mergers will reshape the judicial view of
mergers.8 In another instance, the Department of Justice has issued a state-
ment calling for judicial reinterpretation of the per se illegality of resale price
maintenance. It has also intervened on the side of the defendant in a case to be
decided by the United States Supreme Court during the 1983 term on the basis
that resale price maintenance is justified in certain circumstances.
9
The third theme is the contrast between the economic structure of Canada
and the United States. Economist Richard E. Caves has described the Cana-
dian economy as "small, open to international trade, rather capital intensive,
geographically dispersed in some of its markets, and a net importer of
technology and of direct investment." 1 0 The Canadian economy is much more
concentrated, although the largest companies in Canada are smaller than their
American counterparts. The higher concentration is linked to the minimum
size required by economies of scale and there is a conflict between increasing
the number of competitors and efficiency. Currently, imports are constrained
by a variety of government measures such as customs tariffs, import controls,
and antidumping laws.1 Removal of these constraints and increasing competi-
7 See Gwyn, "Lalonde Trading Competition Act for Popularity," Ottawa Citizen,
Dec. 30, 1982 at 8. A new Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Judy Erola,
was appointed in August, 1983. She is the seventh person to hold the portfolio in twelve
years. In August, 1983, she stated that the timing of the introduction of competition
policy legislation was "up in the air," The Globe andMail, August 24, 1983. While she
is committed to bringing in changes "sooner rather than later," she wants to discuss the
matter with the cabinet before promising that changes will be made and the timing of
such changes. The prospect of legislative change is not bright. It is evident nothing will
happen before 1984 and many doubt that any changes will be introduced in the light of
the upcoming federal election campaign.
8 Reproduced in (1982), 27 Antitrust Law Bulletin 619, and CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
No. 546, Extra Ed., June 16, 1982.
9 Reproduced in (1982), CCH Trade Reg. Rep. para. 50, 442. The Reagan ad-
ministration is not relying solely on administrative persuasion. Spray-Rite Service Corp.
v. Monsanto Co. 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982) (Cert. granted 2-28-83). See "A Power-
ful Bid to Rewrite the Antitrust Rule Book" Business Week, October 10, 1983 at 84.
The Wall Street Journal on March 29, 1983 at 3, reported that William Baxter announc-
ed that proposals have cleared the Reagan cabinet, aimed at "strengthening US com-
petitiveness in world trade." The proposals include a reduction in "rule of reason"
civil cases from triple to single damages and increased protections for patent holders. In
addition, Baxter announced he is working on several proposals to rewrite antitrust laws
including one that would require resale price maintenance be judged under a rule of
reason.
'0 Caves, "Industrial Concentration, Corporate Size, and Market Power:
Economic Evidence and Strategic Choices for Canadian Competition Policy" in
Prichard et al. (eds), supra note 5, 505 at 506. See also Caves, Porter and Spence, Com-
petition in the Open Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); Khemani,
Concentration in the Manufacturing Industries of Canada: Analyses of Post-War
Changes (Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1980).
11 Anti-dumping Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. A-15. See also, Slayton, The Anti-dumping
Tribunal (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1979). The Anti-dumping tribunal
will impose an anti-dumping duty if it decides dumping (selling goods in Canada at a
lower price than in the exporters' country) has caused or is likely to cause material in-
jury to production in Canada of like goods or materially retard establishment in Canada
of the production of like goods. Canada has enacted countervailing duty regulations
under the Customs Tariff Act, R.S.C. 1970 c. C-41 dealing with foreign government
subsidization of exports.
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tion from foreign goods has been suggested as an alternative means of curbing
the oligopolistic power of many industries in Canada.1 2 Others conclude that
tariff reductions will not force firms to become efficient and that Canadian
firms can only compete internationally by becoming much bigger.1
3 Based on
these characteristics, many have argued that the per se rules of the United
States are not appropriate in Canada. They argue for minimal intervention
and placing reliance on "reinvigorating and reinforcing the dynamic forces"
of the market and, further, they argue that each case should be decided on its
merits in order to arrive at "economically realistic decisions."' 14 The problem
is to design competition laws that are appropriate for Canada's economic
structure.
A large proportion of domestic economic activity is regulated or con-
trolled by the government in Canada.15 The regulated sector is very large.
Some twenty-nine percent of gross domestic product was subject to some form
of direct regulation in 1978.16 Each province regulates at least one hundred
trades, occupations or professions.17 Provincial agricultural marketing boards
account for one-quarter of all farm receipts. 18 Canada's economy is a public
enterprise economy. There were at least 233 provincial Crown corporations in
1980 and at least 460 federal ones (including subsidiaries). 19 They account for
over one-half of domestic passenger air travel, one third of the expenditures of
all radio and television broadcasters in Canada, and almost one half the rail
freight transported. It has been estimated that there are sixty-one federal "cor-
12 Caves, supra note 10.
13 Skeoch, with MacDonald, Dynamic Change and Accountability in a Canadian
Market Economy (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, Canada, 1976). Skeoch
sees an increasing integration with the world economy. This will be the natural result of
the "special skills or strong public reputations" of multinational enterprises. "The
developments which will influence the manufacturing and high technology industries
will be international - unless inhibited by government intervention" (at 97). See also
Skeoch, "The Dynamic Change Report and the Proposed Competition Act" in
Prichard et al., supra note 5 at 80, 88 and Stanbury, Dynamic Change and Account-
ability in a Canadian Market Economy: Summary and Critique (1977), 15 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 1 at21.
14Id., Dynamic Change at 97 and 202.
1As of 1978 (the latest figure available), the scope of regulation was about the
same in both countries while the intensity of social regulation was greater in the U.S.
See Stanbury and Thompson (1982) Regulatory Reform in Canada (Montreal: The In-
stitute for Research on Public Policy); Economic Council of Canada, Reforming
Regulation (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, November, 1981).
16Reforming Regulation, id. at 1. In the United States about 26% of the GDP is
subject to some form of regulation. See also Stanbury and Lermer, Regulation and the
Redistribution of Income and Wealth (Unpublished paper, Faculty of Commerce,
University of B.C., November, 1982, forthcoming, in Can. PublicAdministration).
17Evans and Stanbury, Occupational Regulation in Canada (University of Toron-
to, Faculty of Law. Law and Economics Workshop Series WS 111-17, April 1981,
mimeo).
18Forbes, et al., 1982 Economic Intervention and Regulation in Canadian
Agriculture (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada & Institute for Research on Public
Policy/Minister of Supply and Services, 1982).
19 Howard and Stanbury, "Measuring Leviathan: The Size, Scope and Growth of
Governments in Canada" in Lermer (ed.), Government and the Market Economy (The
Fraser Institute, forthcoming).
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porate enterprises" which represent roughly sixty-eight percent of the total
assets of the Federal Government. Federal and provincial Crown corporations
produce about one-eighth of the gross national product.
20
All of this activity occurs without any constraints imposed by the Com-
bines Investigation Act. Recent judicial decisions have exempted the activities
of regulated industries and Crown corporations from the Act. In Jabour v.
The Law Society of British Columbia,21 the Supreme Court held that an action
taken pursuant to a provincial regulatory scheme was exempt from the Act. A
recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal 22 held that, under the doctrine
of Crown immunity, Crown corporations are exempt from the Act unless
liability is specifically provided by statute. In this case, the Crown corpora-
tions were in competition with privately owned businesses against which pro-
ceedings had been initiated and subsequently dropped.
In contrast, in the United States, regulated activities are subject to the an-
titrust laws unless the state clearly indicates its intention to regulate the specific
activity and adequately supervises that regulation. 23 Thus a larger proportion
of domestic economic activities are exempt from the competition laws in
Canada.
II. CANADIAN LEGISLATION: THE COMBINES INVESTIGATION
ACT
Legislative control of anticompetitive conduct began at about the same
time in Canada and the United States. The first competition law in Canada
was passed in 1889, a year before the Sherman Act, and was incorporated in
the Criminal Code in 1892. The first Combines Investigation Act (Act) was
passed in 1910. From that time until 1960 anticompetitive behaviour was
regulated under the Criminal Code and the Act, at which time the Criminal
Code provisions were deleted and embodied in the Act. 24
Enforcement of the Act is carried out by three different administrative of-
ficials or bodies: the Director of Investigation and Research initiates inquiries,
the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (Commission) appraises and
reports, and the Attorney-General prosecutes. The Act divides prohibited con-
duct into criminal offences (Part V) and civil reviewable matters (Part IV. 1).
Provision is also made for general inquiries into anticompetitive practices.
2 Langford, The Unchartered Universe of Federal Public Corporations (Un-
published paper, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, November
1980).
21 Supra note 3. See Stanbury, "Provincial Regulation and the Combines Investiga-
tion Act: The Jabour Case" 1983, forthcoming.
22R. v. Uranium Canada Ltd. and Eldorado Nuclear Ltd., July 16, 1982, (Ont.
C.A.) unreported. Apparently the draft legislation, supra note 6, contains an entirely
new proposal to make Crown Corporations subject to the Combines Investigation Act.
See Canadian Competition Policy Record, supra note 6 at 3.
23Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S. Ct. 307 (1943); California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 100 S. Ct. 937 (1980). See
Gellhorn and Pierce Jr., Regulated Industries (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1982).
2 See Stanbury, W.T., The Legislative Development of Canadian Competition
Policy, 1881-1981 (1981), 2 Can. Competition Policy Record 1 (No. 2).
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A. Criminal Matters: Part V
Alleged violations are investigated by the Director,25 while guilt or in-
nocence for criminal offences is determined by the courts. After an investiga-
tion, the Director may discontinue or make a recommendation to the
Attorney-General that the case be prosecuted (section 15). An alternative pro-
cedure, which has not been used since 1975, is for the Director to refer the mat-
ter to the Commission which holds a hearing and prepares a report (section
18). The Attorney-General would then consider the report and decide whether
to prosecute. The decision to prosecute in criminal matters rests exclusively
with the Attorney-General.
Three general classes of activities are prohibited: agreements to lessen
competition unduly (section 32), participation in mergers and monopolies
detrimental to the public interest (section 33), and unfair trade practices in-
cluding price discrimination, predatory pricing (section 34(a), (b) and (c)),
misleading advertising, 26 the granting of promotional allowances on dispro-
portionate terms (section 35) and resale price maintenance (section 38). The
1976 amendments added the following offences: bid-rigging (section 32.2), im-
plementing foreign directives giving effect to illegal agreements (section 32.1),
pyramid and referral selling (sections 36.3 and 36.4), certain conspiracies in
relation to professional sports (section 32.3), double ticketing (section 36.2),
and bait and switch selling (section 37). The criminal offences in Part V, other
than misleading advertising and deceptive marketing practices, are indictable.
The maximum penalty for conspiracy in restraint of trade is a one million
dollar fine or five years imprisonment or both. The other offences carry an
unlimited fine at the discretion of the court or imprisonment from two to five
years or both.
25 S. 8, Combines Investigation Act, supra note 2. - The Director has extensive in-
vestigatory powers. He may, with the approval of a member of the Commission, on an
exparte application, require written returns supplying such information as the Director
requests including full disclosure of contracts and agreements (s. 9). With the approval
of a member of the Commission, the Director may enter premises and copy or seize
documents without specifying the specific sections of the Act which is being investigated
(s. 10). The Director may require anyone to appear before the Commission and be ex-
amined under oath (s. 12). The search and seizure powers of the Director under
ss. 10(1) and (3) have been attacked as being contrary to the right against unreasonable
search and seizure, s. 8 of the Charter of Rights. The Alberta Court of Appeal in
Southam Inc. v. Director of Investigation and Research, [1983] 3 W.W.R. 385 (Alta.
C.A.), held section 10(1) and (3) to be invalid on the basis that: (1) The Commission
was not an independent, impartial decision maker, (2) s. 10(3) did not require that the
Director have reasonable grounds to suspect an offence had been committed and (3)
s. 10(3) did not require that the application be supported by evidence on oath. The
search powers are discussed in Helix Investments Ltd. v. Director of Investigation and
Research 2 June 1983, Court No. T-1180-83, unreported (Fed. Ct.-Trial Div.).
Although it was not necessary to decide their validity, Walsh J. notes that the provisions
lack the controls normally found in the common law and suggests it might be necessary
for a judge to make the decision on search warrants.
Apparently the draft legislation, supra note 6, would require the Director to inform
the person in charge of the premises of the nature and scope of the inquiry and a person
under inquiry would have the right to be informed of the progress of the inquiry. See
Canadian Competition Policy Record, supra note 6 at 4.
26 S. 36. This paper does not discuss misleading advertising. See Kaiser, WorldLaw
of Competition Unit A North America: Canada Vol. 3A (New York: Mathew Bender,
1982) Chapter 6.
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B. Civil Reviewable Matters: Part IV.1
Civil reviewable matters are adjudicated by the Commission. The Com-
mission is empowered to receive applications from the Director to review
various restrictive practices listed in Part IV.1 and to issue remedial orders
which are binding upon the parties named in it (sections 31.2-31.9). Failure to
comply with such an order is an offence and is subject to a fine, imprisonment,
or both. Civil reviewable matters include refusals to deal (section 31.2), con-
signment selling (section 31.4), exclusive dealing (section 31.6), tied selling
(section 31.4) and market restriction (section 31.4(3)). The Commission may
also review judgments of foreign law directing the conduct of Canadian com-
panies, (section 31.5), the application of foreign law to the Canadian sub-
sidiary of a foreign parent (section 31.6), and the refusal of a foreign supplier
to supply in Canada (section 31.7).
C. General Inquiries
Either the Director, the Commission, or the Minister may conduct general
inquiries into practices or conditions which are related to restraint of trade
(section 47(1)(a)). The Minister may initiate general inquiries by the Director
and the Commission into any matter related to the policy and objectives of the
Act (section 47(1)(b)). The Commission is currently conducting two general
inquiries: The Telecommunications Equipment Inquiry and an inquiry into the
state of competition in the Canadian petroleum industry. In addition, the
Director has standing to make representations before any federal administra-
tive agency concerning competition.27
III. ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
Administration and enforcement will be contrasted under the following
subject headings: private enforcement, institutional arrangements, and infor-
mal enforcement procedures.
One striking contrast is the absence in Canada, until 1976, of a statute-
based, private action for damages caused by anticompetitive behaviour. In the
United States, enforcement is primarily through private action - ninety-five
percent of all antitrust actions are private actions for treble damages. 28 Few
private actions have been brought in Canada. Furthermore, it does not appear
that the private action will become an important tool of enforcement in the
near future at least until the constitutionality of the provision is established. 29
27 See Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Annual Report, March 31, 1981 at
22-24.
28 See Posner, A Statistical Study of Enforcement (1970), 13 J. of Law & Econ.
365.
29 S. 3 1.1(1) creates a statutory cause of action for damages caused by violations of
Part V, criminal offences or failure to comply with an order of the Commission or a
court order made under the Act. The record of prior proceedings in which the defen-
dant was convicted of a violation of the Act or of an order of the Court or the Commis-
sion is, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, proof that the defendant engaged
in conduct contrary to the Act. The constitutionality of this provision is in doubt. Sec-
tion 31.1 was upheld in Henuset Bros. Ltd. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd. (1980), 52 C.P.R.
(2d) 173, 114 D.L.R. (3d) 300 (Alta. Q.B.) and held to be ultra vires in Seiko Time
Canada v. Consumers Distribution Co. (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 221, 50 C.P.R. 147 (Ont.
H.C.) and Rocois Construction Inc. v. Quebec Ready Mix Inc. (1979), 51 C.C.C. (2d)
516, 105 D.L.R. (3d) 15 (Ont. H.C.). As of 1982 there had been 5 actions under s. 31.1,
three of which challenged the constitutionality of the provision.
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Even if the constitutionality issue is settled, private actions may not become
popular because of the limitation to single damages and the difficulty of bring-
ing a class action.3 0 The injured are more likely to rely on a tort action for
damages for conspiracy.
3'
30The Combines Investigation Act does not provide for a class action whereby
those injured by conduct contrary to the Act could sue in one representative class. This
was proposed in Bill C-42 and C-13 in 1977. See Reid, "Class Actions: Deterrence,
Redress or Legal Nightmare" in Rowley and Stanbury (eds.) Competition Policy in
Canada: Stage II, Bill C-13 (Ottawa: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1978).
Plaintiffs must rely on the Rules of Court in each province, e.g. British Columbia
Supreme Court Rule 5(11). The courts have required that plaintiffs seek recovery from a
fund in which all class members have a common interest so that individual claims do not
require an individual assessment. A recent Supreme Court of Canada decision has
upheld an Ontario Court of Appeal decision which overturned a trial decision permit-
ting owners of Firenza automobiles to bring a class action to recover damages for a
design defect under Ontario Rules of Practice, R. 75. In General Motors of Canada
Ltd. v. Naken (S.C.C.) March 25, 1982 (unreported). Five judges, in a unanimous deci-
sion, limited Ontario Rule 75 (which is essentially the same as B.C. Rule 5(11)) to cases
where "there is created in the course of the action or as a result thereof a fund or a pool
of assets. The fund is then subject to pro rata distribution ... according to their respec-
tive participation.. ." at 28. The claim of Firenza owners raised serious problems about
the identification of the members of the class. It would be necessary to determine in
each case whether the claimant had purchased the car with reference to the advertising
of the defendant and the damages (limited by the pleadings to $1000). Damages could
not be calculated on the basis of the decrease in the resale price of the car because some
could have purchased the car for "infinite retention." Class actions may be available,
however, in s. 31.1 actions for damages caused by price fixing conspiracies. In that case
there is no need to calculate damages on an individual basis. Rather all the members of
the class calculate their damage using the same formula: the number of items purchased
times the amount of the overcharge. See Alberta Pork Producers Marketing Board v.
Swift Canadian Co. (1981), 16 Alta. L.R. (2d) 313, 129 D.L.R. (3d) 411 (Alta. Q.B.)
The plaintiffs claimed damages by reason of the tortious conspiracy of the defendants
to purchase hogs at a price lower than what would have prevailed in the absence of the
conspiracy. The Court held a class action was available. See Estey J. in Naken, supra at
24. See Prichard, et al., "Private Enforcement and Class Actions" in Prichard, et al.,
supra note 5.
3 1 See B.C. Lightweight Aggregate v. Canada Cement La Farge Ltd. [1981] 4
W.W.R. 385, 26 B.C.L.R. 292 (B.C.C.A.) (common law action for the tort of con-
spiracy). The plaintiffs claimed they had suffered damages caused by the defendants'
price fixing and market sharing agreement. The defendants had pleaded guilty to con-
spiracy charges under s. 32 of the Combines Investigation Act. The trial judge awarded
damages of $750,000. The common law tort of conspiracy was established by a finding
that "the defendants conspired to eliminate all competitors and succeeded in so doing."
It was not necessary to show an express intent to injure the plaintiff. It was sufficient
that the plaintiff "fell within the broad objective of the conspiracy." The British Col-
umbia Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial judge. The Supreme Court
reversed the Trial and Court of Appeal decisions and dismissed the action, (1983), 145
D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.). Estey J. delivering the judgment defined two cases in which
the tort of conspiracy to injure is available:
(1) whether the means used by the defendants are lawful or unlawful, the predomi-
nant purpose of the defendants' conduct is to cause injury to the plaintiff; or,
(2) where the conduct of the defendants is unlawful, the conduct is directed
towards the plaintiff (alone or together with others), and the defendants should
know in the circumstances that injury to the plaintiff is likely to and does result.
A constructive intent to injure is sufficient under case two. This can be inferred from
"the fact that the defendant should have known injury to the plaintiff would ensue."
(at 399). Estey J. held that case one did not apply and that the plaintiffs failed to bring
themselves within case two because they were not the targets of the conspiracy. They
were suppliers not competitors of the defendants. The conspiracy "had to be directed
towards the participation of the plaintiff in the concrete products market. . ." (at 400)
Estey J. also decided there was no casual connection between the unlawful activities of
the defendants and the commercial demise of the plaintiffs.
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Two characteristics of the institutional arrangements in Canada are the
separation of the functions of investigation, prosecution and adjudication as
well as the granting of exclusive jurisdiction over each function to a different
administrator. First, there is a separation of functions; in particular, the
separation of the initiation of cases and adjudication in civil matters between
the Director and the Commission. In contrast, the Federal Trade Commission
in the United States initiates the cases that it decides. The functions of in-
vestigation and prosecution are separated between the Director and the
Attorney-General in Canada. They are combined under the Department of
Justice in the United States. Second, overlapping jurisdictions are eliminated
in Canada. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission and the
Department of Justice have concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and bring
proceedings under the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. 32 In Canada, only
the Director on his own initiative or on the direction of the Minister begins
inquiries into either civil or criminal matters.3 3 The Attorney-General has
exclusive discretion to prosecute and the Director has exclusive jurisdiction to
initiate hearings into civil reviewable matters.
The Federal Trade Commission has been criticized on the ground that it
initiates the cases it decides. These criticisms have been investigated and re-
jected by Posner who points out that separation of functions may cause prob-
lems of coordination. 34 Canadians appear satisfied with the current separation
of investigation and adjudication between the Director and the Commission
which has been described as a "necessary, independent check on the single
minded enthusiasm of the investigators and policy makers." 35 In fact, recom-
mendations have been made to further separate their functions by transferring
the present requirement that the Commission approve of the use of in-
vestigatory powers by the Director to a court even though there is no evidence
that bias is created by the existing arrangement. 36
The separation of the investigative and prosecutorial functions between
the Director and the Attorney General has meant that some cases are not as
vigorously prosecuted as some might desire. This separation of functions also
impedes the development of a consistent, centrally-controlled competition
policy. It has been suggested that the Director be empowered to lay charges
directly and to develop a small, specialized, legal staff together with selected
outside counsel to argue the case. 37 If this recommendation is adopted,
Canada's institutional arrangements would be better designed to produce a
consistent competition policy than the arrangement in the United States
32See Neale and Goyder, The Antitrust Laws of the United States of America
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), Chapter 12.
33 S. 8, Combines Investigation Act, supra note 2. The Minister may overrule a
decision to discontinue an inquiry: s. 14(4).
34 Posner, The Behaviour of Administrative Agencies (1972), 1 J. of Leg. Studies305.
35 Skeoch, Dynamic Change, supra note 13 at 326.36 Id. at 321. See discussion supra note 25 on attacks on these powers based on the
right against unreasonable search and seizure, s. 8 of the Charter of Rights.
37 Stanbury, supra note 13 at 6. Stanbury refers to "the demonstrated lack of en-
thusiasm of the Department of Justice for combines cases" and "their extensive capaci-
ty to repeatedly 'review' and delay justiciable prosecutions."
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whereby control is dispersed between the Federal Trade Commission, the
Department of Justice and private plaintiffs.
38
Use of informal administrative enforcement is much more extensive and
appears to be more effective in the United States than in Canada. Informal en-
forcement in the United States includes guidelines, advisory opinions,
agreements, and consent decrees.3 9 In Canada, the Director has an informal
programme of compliance under which he will advise firms as to his opinion
on the legality of their actions. 40 Firms are not legally required, however, to
contact the Director. There is no mandatory pre-merger notification require-
ment as there is in the United States.4 1 It is difficult to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of this programme because the only data relates to the firms that did
ask for advice and not the impact of competition rules on the firms which did
not. It is reasonable to assume that this latter group could be quite large given
the historically conservative approach of the courts and the recent Supreme
Court decisions. The ineffectiveness of the merger legislation, however, is
demonstrated by the fact there were only six requests for clearance from 1968
to 1975, a period in which there were hundreds of mergers. 42 Not all critics
favour an extensive compliance programme. One critic viewed it as a "neces-
sary evil rather than a virtue" and recommended that the Director should not
negotiate with business people except for the non-recurring actions of mergers
and rationalization agreements. 43 The imposition in the United States, in 1974,
of procedural protections to increase the thoroughness of judicial scrutiny of
consent decrees was partly a reaction to criticism that the government was too
lenient in granting settlements.
In addition to providing advisory opinions, the Director has issued
guidelines on such conduct as mergers and specialization agreements. 44 There
38 See Hawk, "EEC and U.S. Competition Policies - Contrast and Convergence"
in Rowe, et al. (eds.) Enterprise Law of the 80's (New York: American Bar Association,
1980).
39 See Sullivan, Handbook of the Law ofAntitrust (St. Paul: West Publishing Co.,
1977) chapter 6; and Branfman, "Antitrust Consent Decrees - A Review and Evalua-
tion of the First Seven Years Under Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act" (1982), 27
Antitrust Bul. 303.
40 See Director of Investigation and Research, Annual Report for a discussion of
each year's activities. For a discussion and evaluation of the program see Gorecki and
Stanbury, "Canada's Combines Investigation Act: The Record of Public Law Enforce-
ment, 1889-1976" in Prichard, et al. supra note 5 at 135.
41 S. 7A of the Clayton Act, enacted in 1976, 15 U.S.C.A. s. 18a. Apparently the
draft legislation, supra note 6, would require notification to the Director of mergers in-
volving assets or revenues in excess of $500 millions where the business to be acquired
had assets or revenues of $20 millions or more. See Canadian Competition Policy
Record, supra note 6 at 6.
42Gorecki, The Administration and Enforcement of Competition Policy in
Canada, 1960 to 1975: an Application of Performance Measurement (Ottawa: Ministry
of Supply and Services, 1979) at 111:
businessmen had no desire to be addressed upon the subject of the merger provi-
sions realizing that the implication of the Beer and Sugar decisions essentially
meant the law was a dead letter.
43 Skeoch, Dynamic Change, supra note 13 at 221.
44Mergers: Director of Investigation and Research, Annual Report, March 31,
1966 printed in Kaiser, World Law of Competition, Canada, Vol. 3A (New York:
Mathew Bender, 1982) at s. 10.04. Specialization Agreements: Henry, "Anti-Combines
Legislation in Canada," Meredith Memorial Lectures, McGill University, 1971, printed
in Kaiser, s. 8.07. Trade Associations: Henry, Address to the Institute of Association
Executives, June 2, 1961, printed in Kaiser, at s. 8.06.
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is some enforcement of negotiated settlements in Canada. The Director has no
formal power to require undertakings from firms although, recently, the
Director did obtain an undertaking in a merger investigation whereby the ac-
quiring firm agreed to treat the target firm as a passive investment. 45 Prohibi-
tion orders have been obtained in cases in which there has been no charge or if
charges are laid there is no assessment of guilt. 46 In contrast to the Federal
Trade Commission, the Commission does not have the power to issue trade
regulation rules. The Cabinet makes regulations under the Act. 47
IV. SUBSTANTIVE RULES
The following discussion will focus on the substantive offences of cartel
agreements, monopolization, mergers, and vertical restraints such as resale
price maintenance and exclusive dealing.
48
A. Cartels
Agreements among firms to restrain competition are governed by section
32 of the Act which prohibits conspiracies, combinations, agreements or ar-
rangements that lessen competition unduly.49 Between 1910 and 1975, there
45Director of Investigation and Research, Annual Report, March 31, 1979 at
22-25.
46 See infra at note 85.
47 S. 48, Combines Investigation Act, supra note 2.
48 Due to lack of space, conduct specified in the Act such as: misleading advertis-
ing, and price discrimination, will not be discussed. In Canada price discrimination
which is injurious to competition among the purchasers of the discriminating seller
(secondary-line discrimination) is regulated by section 34(l)(a) of the Act. The Crown
must show that the seller knowingly engages in a practice of selling articles of a like
quality and price, at a price which is different from that offered at the same time to the
competitors of the purchaser. The section, in addition to price advantage, covers con-
cessions such as discounts, allowances, rebates, other advantages, etc. The requirement
of discrimination against competitors means that sales to final consumers are not
covered by the section. The Crown must show that the purchaser receiving the advan-
tage and other buyers are competitors. The section applies only to articles, not services.
Volume discounts are permitted without showing that they are cost justified as is re-
quired by Section 2 of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson Patman Act in the
US (15 U.S.C.A. s. 13 as amended 49 Stat. 1526 (1936)). In addition, the seller must
know it is price discriminating. It would not be guilty, for example, if it did not know
the purchasers were competitors. Section 31.3(b) makes the practice of consignment
selling for the purpose of price discrimination a civil reviewable matter. There is doubt
whether s. 34(1)(b) catches sellers who charge higher prices for a product with the
seller's name on it than for products to which purchasers affix their own brand names.
The Director, in 1966, doubted whether branded and nonbranded products were of the
same quality. (Address of the Director of Investigation and Research August 10, 1966,
p. 10). In the United States, it has been held these are the same product and that the
practice is price discrimination. The Supreme Court held in FTC v. Borden (1966) 383
U.S. 637, 86 S.C. 1092, that there would be no injury to competition if the price dif-
ference merely reflected consumer preferences for the sellers' brand name. See Dunlop,
"Price Discrimination, Predatory Pricing and Systematic Delivered Pricing" in Pritch-
ard et al., supra note 5 at 405, Moore, "Delivered Pricing, Price Discrimination and
Price Differentiation" in Prichard, id. at 421; Nozick, The Regulation of Price
Discrimination Under the Combines Investigation Act, (1976), 54 Can. Bar. Rev. 309.
There has been one prohibition order under subsection (a): R. v. Mary Maxim Knitting
Wool, May 16, 1968, Exchequer Court of Canada, unreported.
49 Four categories of offences are enumerated in section 32. First, to limit unduly
facilities in relation to a product; second, to limit unduly the production of the product
or unreasonably enhance its price; third, to lessen competition in the various stages of
production and distribution of a product or in the price of insurance; and fourth, "to
otherwise restrain or injure competition unduly." Product includes services. In 1976 a
new section (s. 32(1.1)) was added to make it explicit that it is not necessary to prove
that the parties intended to eliminate completely or virtually all competition.
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were seventy-four prosecutions under section 32.50 This compares with a total
of 989 horizontal conspiracy cases brought by the United States Department
of Justice from 1890 to 1969.51 Two recent Supreme Court of Canada deci-
sions adopted stricter rules for conspiracies and the success rate of the Crown
dropped from ninety-seven percent in the five years from 1970 to 1975 to
forty-eight percent during the period 1975 to 1981.52
In contrast to the Sherman Act, the Canadian legislation prohibits only
those agreements which lessen competition "unduly." In the United States,
the courts have classified some agreements as illegal per se.53 In Canada the ef-
fect of every agreement must be assessed to determine if it is "undue." Courts
have differed as to the appropriate criteria for this assessment. For example, is
it confined to an evaluation of the effect on competition or may benefits such
as increased employment be taken into account? Even if "undue" is confined
to the impact on competition, does it require that competition be completely
eliminated or is it sufficient that the parties control a substantial part of the
market?
The two recent Supreme Court decisions of Aetna Insurance and Atlantic
Sugar address the issues of 1) the extent to which competition must be les-
sened, 2) the admissibility of evidence of public benefit and 3) the definition of
agreement. 54 Before these decisions, agreements where the parties controlled
less than all the market were found to have an "undue" effect. In the 1982
decision in Atlantic Sugar, the Supreme Court appears to adopt the test that
competition must be lessened to the point where "the participants in the agree-
ment become free to carry on those activities virtually unaffected by the in-
fluence of competition." ' 55 The Court held that a "tacit" agreement by three
companies to maintain their market shares over thirteen years where the three
jointly accounted for over ninety percent of the market was not an undue
lessening of competition. It found that competition had not been eliminated
because all price competition had not been suppressed, although there was
some discounting to large buyers.
The 1976 amendment to the Act, which specifies that virtual elimination
of competition is not necessary, did not apply because the conduct in Atlantic
Sugar took place before 1976. It is doubtful, however, that the outcome would
have been any different because the question of undueness is still a question of
fact and it would be open to a court to acquit where the defendants have less
than the whole market. In Atlantic Sugar, the Supreme Court failed to ap-
preciate the quality of the competition that remained. For example, it is not
50 Gorecki, supra note 40 at 187.
51 While this difference is partially explained by the difference in the size of the
economies, the U.S. figure does not reflect cases brought by the FTC. Stanbury con-
cludes that "in absolute terms the number of antitrust cases in Canada has been small."
Prichard, supra note 5 at 159.52 Stanbury, Materials on Competition Policy. (unpublished, University of British
Columbia, Faculty of Law, 1982).
53 See Neale, supra note 32, chapter 1.
54Supra note 3. See McFetridge and Wong, Agreements to Lessen Competition
After Atlantic Sugar (1980-81), 5 Can. Bus. L.J. 329; Reschenthaler and Stanbury, Re-
cent Conspiracy Decisions in Canada: New Legislation Needed, (1981), 26 Antitrust
Bul. 839.
55This is the text adpoted by Cartwright J. in Howard Smith Paper Mills Ltd. et al.
v. The Queen, [1957] S.C.R. 403 at 406, 118 C.C.C. 321 at 345 (S.C.C.).
Anti-Competitive Behaviour
uncommon for a few big buyers or even a monopolist to receive discounts
from oligopolistic sellers while the great bulk of sales are made at list price to
smaller and less powerful buyers. Two possible explanations for these dis-
counts are that the sellers are exercising countervailing power or that the sellers
are practicing price discrimination. In the latter case, it may be argued that the
quality of competition remaining does not justify a market sharing agreement.
Indeed, the discounting in Atlantic Sugar could not have been unrestrained
since maintenance of constant market shares over a long period of time re-
quires that the parties not be permitted to take large customers away from a
rival through discounting. On the evidence, the competition that remained was
insufficient to destabilize the smoothly coordinated market sharing arrange-
ment. For example, when a new firm entered with about six percent of the
market, the big three were able to adjust and thereafter maintain the same pro-
portional share as they held before entry. This decision indicates that the ex-
istence of almost any competition will support a finding that the lessening of
competition was not undue. 
56
The Supreme Court also appears to have changed the rule from undueness
being assessed solely in terms of the impact of the agreement on competition to
permitting an assessment of benefits to the public. The decisions in both
Atlantic Sugar and Aetna Insurance appear to require a specific intent to
lessen competition unduly. This requirement necessitates an examination of
the objectives of the defendants - objectives which may include public
benefits. In Atlantic Sugar the trial judge acquitted the accused because,
among other things, the defendants intended to achieve industrial price stabili-
ty. In Aetna Insurance the Court gave weight to the various public benefits
produced by the agreement among insurance underwriters: the classification
of properties into similar risk categories, advice on fire prevention services to
local governments, and stabilization of the fire insurance industry. Even if we
think this evidence should be considered, it was not adequately evaluated in
these cases. At no time did the Court weigh those benefits against the anti-
competitive effects of price fixing.
In the United States, in contrast, the Supreme Court has just recently
reaffirmed that the impact of agreements, in rule of reason cases, is to be
assessed solely in terms of the impact on competition. In National Society of
Professional Engineers, it was argued that the cartel produced a higher quality
product in that competition would have driven engineers to produce unsafe
bridges and skyscrapers. The Supreme Court said:
Contrary to its name, the rule (of reason) does not open the field of antitrust in-
quiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the
realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on
competitive conditions ... the purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about
the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy
favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of
an industry .... 57
The Supreme Court decision in Atlantic Sugar also appears to require
evidence of an express agreement between the parties - a tacit agreement is
not sufficient. The Court held that the adoption of identical pricing schemes
56 The quality of the competition remaining is analyzed in Stanbury, Reschenthaler
and MacCrimmon, The Enforceability of Section 32 of the Combines Investigation Act,
(unpublishedpaper, UniversityofBritish Columbia, 1983).
57 435U.S. 679,98S.C. 1355at 1363 (1979).
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and maintenance of constant market shares was insufficient to show an agree-
ment among the defendants. There had been no evidence of communication
between them and the Court concluded that the uniform prices "... . was a
result of independent decisions called 'conscious parallelism' which is not
illegal." 58
An agreement is necessary in the United States also, but it can be inferred
from the circumstances. Evidence of communication is not necessary. In the
Container Corporation case, an agreement was inferred from the widespread
exchange of price information in a market in which the eighteen defendants
had over ninety percent of the market and the products were homogeneous.59
The principal question is not whether consciously parallel conduct is con-
trary to section 32, but what evidence is sufficient to establish an agreement.
The effect of Atlantic Sugar appears to be that evidence of coordinated con-
duct in the absence of express communication is not sufficient to show an
agreement. This conclusion is not necessarily inconsistent with earlier deci-
sions, since it is arguable that in all cases there was evidence of some com-
munication between the defendants in addition to price announcements,
uniform pricing and price monitoring, from which agreement could be infer-
red. 6° Identifying communication as a necessary condition is a mechanistic ap-
proach which ignores the realities of the economic impact of the defendant's
conduct. If the market conditions indicate a price fixing agreement would be
successful and the defendant's conduct is consistent with such an agreement,
this should be sufficient. 61 Otherwise, firms will be able to effectively fix prices
and escape prosecution by avoiding meetings in "smoke filled rooms." The
Court can be criticized for adopting a legalistic approach to the concept of
agreement rather than assessing both the conditions of the market conducive
to collusion and relating these conditions to the evidence of collusive
behaviour in order to evaluate the impact of the alleged agreement. For exam-
ple, market conditions conducive to collusion in Atlantic Sugar included bar-
riers to entry, a homogeneous product, and the absence of a fringe of small
sellers. Conduct of the defendants which implied the existence of an agreement
were the fixed relative market shares, the exchanges of price information, and
base point pricing.
The Canadian Act exempts some agreements which might lessen competi-
tion substantially. Agreements among affiliated companies, including
agreements between parents and subsidiaries, are exempt. 62 In the United
58Per Pigeon J., [1980] 2. S.C.R. 644 at 656, 16 C.R. (3d) 128 at 138-9.
59 U.S. v. Container Corporation ofAmerica, 393 U.S. 333, 89 S.C. 510 (1969).
60 In the two cases, where the Crown was successful, which involved signaling
through price announcements, there was also evidence of communication: R. v. Armco
Ltd. et al. (1976), 13 0.R. (2d) 32, 70 D.L.R. (3d) 287, (O.C.A.). R. v. Canadian
GeneralElectric Co. Ltd. (1976), 17 C.P.R. (2d) 211 (Ont. H.C.).61See Posner, Antitrust Law (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1976); Stigler, "A
Theory of Oligopoly" in Stigler, The Organization of Industry (1968); Stanbury and
Reschenthaler, Oligopoly and Conscious Parallelism: Theory, Policy and the Canadian
Cases(1977), 15 Osgoode Hall L.J. 617.
62S. 32(7). Section 32(3) creates an exemption for exchange of information on
standards and statistics. The 1976 amendments exempt amateur sport from the opera-
tion of the Act. Section 32.3 prohibits limiting the opportunities of any person to par-
ticipate, as a player/competitor, in professional sports or to impose unreasonable terms
or conditions upon such persons including limiting the opportunity for persons to
negotiate with or play with the team of its choice in a professional league.
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States, agreements between parents and subsidiaries, so called "bathtub con-
spiracies," when their "purpose and effect is a coercive effect on third par-
ties" 63 are not exempt. In Canada, export agreements are exempt if they do
not reduce the volume of exports, do not reduce competition unduly in a
domestic market, and do not restrict entry into the exporting business. 64 There
is no registration requirement as there is under the Webb-Pomerene Act in the
United States. 65 The largest exemption to the Act is the non-statutory exemp-
tion for regulated industries. As mentioned earlier, it appears that it is suffi-
cient if the statute setting up a regulatory scheme merely authorizes regulation.
There is no requirement, as in the United States under the state action doc-
trine, that the province clearly express its intention to regulate the specific con-
duct at issue and to actively supervise the scheme.
66
Bid-rigging was made illegal per se by the 1976 amendments. 67 Thus it is
not necessary to show that the conduct lessened competition unduly.
Agreements not to submit a bid and to submit bids that are arrived at by agree-
ment are prohibited if the agreement is not known to the person calling for
bids.
There is no specific exemption from the cartel provisions of section 32 for
specialization agreements. Legislation was proposed in 1977 which would per-
mit agreements "likely to bring about substantial gains in efficiency" which
"will save resources for the Canadian economy." The Director has issued
guidelines which consider the state of the tariff and the effect on entry in deter-
mining whether the agreement is undue. 68 Section 32.1 is directed at multi-
national corporations. Any company in Canada which implements a directive,
policy, or instruction of a foreign company or person for the purpose of carry-
ing out a conspiracy to lessen competition unduly is guilty of an offence. The
Canadian company need not have known of the conspiracy agreement. 69
The April 1981 reform proposal would divide agreements to restrain com-
63 Neale, supra note 32 at 159 n. 1, quoting the Report of the Attorney General's
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, 1955. The United States Supreme
Court will decide during the 1983 term whether it is illegal for a parent and a subsidiary
to conspire to restrain trade: Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 691 F.2d
310 (7th Cir. 1982). The Department of Justice has filed an amicus brief raising the issue
of the extent to which "a parent corporation violates antitrust laws by planning
marketing strategies with one of its own subsidiaries." See "A Powerful Bid to Reunite
the Antitrust Rule Book," supra note 9 at 84.
64 S. 32(4). Apparently the draft legislation, supra note 6, would broaden the ex-
emption for export agreements. See Canadian Competition Policy Record, supra note 6
at 3.
65 Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C.A., ss. 61-65 (1973), s. 5.
The Webb-Pomerene Act has been supplemented by the Export Trading Company Act
15U.S.C.A., ss.4001-4003,4011-4021 (WestSupp. 1983).
66 Text, supra notes 15 to 23.
67 See R. v. Travelways School Transit Ltd. et al. (1980), 52 C.C.C. (2d) 399, 52
C.P.R. (2d) 63, (Ont. H.C.).
68 Supra note 44. The draft legislation, supra note 6, provides for approval by the
RTPC of specialization agreements where the firms constitute more than 50% of the
market and an appeal to the cabinet when the RTPC denies approval. Specialization
agreements would be permitted which relate to products already in production which
result in substantial gains in efficiency. See Canadian Competition Policy Record, supra
note 6 at 4.
69 There is no liability for individuals under section 32.1.
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petition into two classes. 70 Those agreements which economists recognize as
having very few benefits such as price fixing, allocation of market shares, or
restrictions on entry would be illegal if competition is likely to be lessened. It
would not be necessary to show an undue lessening. All other agreements to
restrain competition would be illegal where the parties jointly account for
some given percentage of the market. This is to be contrasted with the
American rule which would find the first class of agreements illegal per se
without showing a lessening of competition and the second class which would
be subjected to a rule of reason analysis. There may not be much difference in
actual outcome in the second class since agreements where the parties have a
significant market share will rarely overcome the rule of reason analysis.
B. Monopolization
Section 33 of the Combines Investigation Act provides that every one
"who is a party.., to... the formation of, a merger or monopoly is guilty of
an indictable offence.... " In addition to a fine or imprisonment, a court may
issue a prohibition order which, among other things, would dissolve the
monopoly. This divestiture power has never been used. There has been only
one conviction following a trial in a monopoly prosecution. 71 As of 1982, there
have been nine other cases heard by the Courts. One case resulted in a guilty
plea,72 three cases resulted in prohibition orders without an admission of
guilt, 73 and there were acquittals in five cases. 74
Monopoly power can arise in several ways: (1) monopolies through effi-
ciencies and internal growth, (2) monopoly through exclusionary conduct,
and (3) monopoly through merger. There are different presumptions about
the consequences for economic efficiency of these three methods. Method one
is presumed to be efficient. In Canada and the United States, possession of a
monopoly without exploitation of that power to exclude competitors is not il-
legal. Method two is presumed to be inefficient and is illegal in both countries.
The harmful effects of the exclusionary market practices are usually obvious.
Method three, mergers for monopoly, is not as obviously categorized as harm-
ful because the question is the future effect of the merger on competition.
1. Mergers for Monopoly
Monopoly power achieved through merger must be distinguished from
other causes. In the United States, mergers are regulated under section 7 of the
70 Apparently the draft legislation referred to, supra note 6, does not distinguish
types of conspiracies but merely prohibits conspiracies which "lessen competition
significantly." See McQuaig, supra note 6 at 38.
71Eddy Match Co. v. The Queen (1954), 18 C.R. 357, 20 C.P.R. 107, (Que.
Q.B.-Appeal side).
72R. v. Electric Reduction Company of Canada Ltd. (1970), 61 C.P.R. 235 (Ont.
H.C.).
73R. v. Canada Safeway Ltd. (1973), 12 C.P.R. (2d) 3, [1974] 1 W.W.R. 210 (Alta.
S.C.); R.v. Wee FolkDiaper Service Inc. et al., Exchequer Court Canada, Feb. 10, 1971
(unreported); R. v. Anthes Imperial Ltd. Federal Ct. of Canada, Feb. 23, 1973
(unreported).
74R. v. British Columbia Sugar Refining Company Ltd. (1960), 129 C.C.C. 7, 32
W.W.R. 577 (Man. Q.B.); R. v. Allied Chemical Ltd. and Cominco Ltd. (1975), 24
C.P.R. (2d) 221; R. v. Canadian General Electric et al. (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 360, 34
C.C.C. (2d) 489; R. v. Hoffman LaRoche Ltd. Ontario Provincial Court, May 20, 1976
(unreported); R. v. K.C. Irving Ltd., supra note 3.
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Clayton Act and monopolies are regulated under section 2 of the Sherman
Act.75 The linking of mergers and monopolies in the Canadian legislation has
caused confusion and misunderstanding when monoplies have been formed by
merger. The inference of harm from mergers rests on assumptions about the
impact of market structure which predict that once monopoly power exists the
monopolist will cut output and raise prices. Weighed against this is the
possibility of increased efficiencies. In most cases, however, future harm to
competition can be assumed in mergers for monopoly and acquisition of a
monopoly should be sufficient to establish public detriment. If the merger has
not been completed, the remedy of prohibition is relatively costless. In con-
trast, under method two (monopoly through exclusionary conduct), public
detriment is shown by conduct and not by mere control of all the market. The
appropriate remedy is also not clear since the American experience with
divestiture has shown most such victories to be "pyrrhic." 76 Thus there is an
argument for treating monopoly by merger under a merger provision, as is the
practice in the United States, and not monopolization. In Canada, this distinc-
tion has not been made and in K. C. Irving,77 the Supreme Court, in a merger
for monopoly case, held that mere acquisition of one hundred percent of the
market did not establish public detriment. This will be dealt with in a later
section.
2. Monopoly through exclusionary conduct: Operation of a Monopoly
The principal issue is the definition of the conduct constituting
monopolization. Monopoly, in the Canadian Act, is defined as a situation
where persons in substantial or complete control of the market have operated
or are likely to operate the business to the detriment of the public. In both
Canada and the United States mere possession of monopoly power is not suffi-
cient. In the United States, the intent and purpose of the defendant with
monopoly power must be to create or maintain a monopoly, an intent which is
inferred from the acts of the defendant. 78 In Canada, the monopoly must be
likely to operate to the public detriment. The principal difference appears to be
the type of conduct which is sufficient to establish monopolization. In the
United States, the intent and purpose to monopolize can be proved without
showing overt acts of exploitation and predation. A distinction is drawn be-
tween the firm which is a passive beneficiary of monopoly power and any con-
duct more positive than this designed to maintain or expand such power. The
Canadian position is closer to that of the 1911 United States Supreme Court
decision in Standard Oil which defined monopolization as "a departure from
the normal methods of industrial development" - the kind of conduct which
violates section 1 of the Sherman Act.79 In Canada, in R. v. Electric Reduction
Company of Canada Ltd. (ERCO), in which the accused pleaded guilty, Stark
J. referred to protecting and preserving a "monopolistic situation by unfair
75 Clayton Act, section 7 (15 U.S.C.A. s. 18). Before the adoption of section 7, the
U.S. also experienced difficulty in prohibiting mergers for monopoly under their
monopolization provisions: U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Co. 247 U.S. 32 (1918) (fif-
ty acquisitions were considered separately rather than cumulatively, no single merger
establishing intent to monopolize).76 Elzinga, The Anti-merger Law: Pyrrhic Victories? (1969), 12 J. Law. Econ. 43.
77 Supra note 2.
78 U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa); U.S. v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 86 S.C. 1698 (1966).
79 Standard Oil of New Jersey v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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means by buying up all existing competition, entering into agreements and ar-
rangements so that the situation of monopoly can be preserved at all costs."
80
Whether this refers to something less than predatory conduct cannot be deter-
mined from the case law. In Eddy Match, the one monopoly case resulting in a
conviction after a trial, there was ample evidence of abusive conduct such as
industrial spying, fighting brands and rebates. 81 In Cast Iron Soil Pipe, the
Commission inferred public detriment from acts preventing the sale of a plant
site to a competitor. 82 In ERCO, the defendants entered into arrangements to
reduce import competition, in addition to entering into long term contracts
which the Commission held foreclosed the market to rivals.
83
As in the United States, substantial control under section 33 is measured
by the market share of the defendants. In the cases before the Courts and the
Commission, the defendants have had very high market shares ranging be-
tween ninety percent and one hundred percent. Less than this has been suffi-
cient in the United States. In Alcoa, Hand J. concluded that ninety percent "is
enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or fifty-four per-
cent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three percent is not."
84
3. Enforcement
A remedy similar to the consent decree procedure in the United States has
been developed under the provision empowering a court to issue prohibi-
tions.8 5 In Cast Iron Soil Pipe, after the Commission found that the defend-
ants were in substantial control of the market and had abused their dominant
position, the Company complied with the Commission's recommendations
and the Crown elected not to prosecute. The Crown obtained a prohibition
order under section 30(2), implementing its recommendations. 86 This section
does not require a conviction under the Act but merely a finding that the per-
son "has done, is about to do or is likely to do any act.., directed toward the
commission of an offence under Part V." These orders can substantially affect
the future conduct of the defendant. Canada Safeway was prohibited from
80 Supra note 72 at 236. Stark J. said:
it must be clear to any businessman or business company which finds itself in a
monopolistic situation that in that case, especially strict standards of conduct are
required and must be met by any business, and they are not entitled to protect and
preserve that monopolistic situation by unfair means, by buying up all existing
competition, entering into agreements and arrangements so that the situation of
monopoly can be preserved at all costs.81 Supra note 1.
82 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Report Concerning the Production,
Manufacture, Supply and Sale of Cast Iron Soil Pipe Fittings in the Prairie Provinces
and British Columbia (1967).
83 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, A Report Concerning the Production,
Distribution and Sale of Phosphates, other Phosphorous Chemicals and Sodium
Chlorate (1966).
84 Supra note 78.
85 S. 39(3). See supra note 39.
86 Supra note 82. See also R. v. Canada Safeway Ltd. (1973), 12 C.P.R. (2d) 3
(Alta. S.C.) (Prohibition order granted without an admission of guilt.) Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission, A Report in the Matter of an Inquiry Relating to the
Manufacture, Formulation, Distribution and Sale of Weed Killers, Insecticides and
Related Products (1965) (Prohibition order concerning sections 32 and 38 without
charges being laid): R. v. Chipman Chemical Ltd. and the Sherwin- Williams Company
of Canada Ltd., Fed. Ct., Sept. 18, 1972, (unreported).
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horizontal acquisitions for five years, from opening more than one store in
two markets, increasing the size of existing stores and saturation advertising.
8 7
The April 1981 reform recommendation proposes to create a new civil law
provision which will replace section 33. Both monopoly and joint monopoly
will be regulated. The provision will set out the percentage of market share
which will be deemed to be a dominant firm for the purposes of the section.
Mere possession of market power will not be sufficient. The firm or firms must
engage in one of twelve types of anti-competitive conduct set out and the con-
duct must have the effect of eliminating a competitor, restricting entry, or
restricting the growth of a competitor or be intended to have that effect.88 The
remedy would be a cease and desist order and a court would have the power to
order divestiture. This clearly does not go as far as the current American law
which does not appear to require overt acts of predation or exclusion, but this
may be appropriate within the context of Canada's economic structure. Some
suggest that we should not be concerned about monopolies which do not
engage in predatory conduct because they can be subjected to international
competition. In addition, within the context of the small size of the Canadian
economy, a monopoly may be more efficient than a number of smaller firms
because of economies of scale. Caves suggests that under a provision which
sets the market share threshold for a dominant firm at fifty percent, and also
covers joint monopolization, there will not be a major problem created by the
"good trust." He concludes that there is a very real possibility that the size is
dictated by scale economies. In that case the solution is to maximize the
"monopoly's exposure to competition in international trade." Caves also con-
cludes that the probable existence of scale economies means that divestiture
should be resorted to only if an injunction is not an adequate remedy.89
4. Exclusionary Practices
Section 34(1)(c) creates a separate criminal offence for predatory pricing.
It prohibits "engaging in a policy of selling products at prices unreasonably
low" which has the tendency or effect or is designed to have the effect of
substantially lessening competition. The first conviction for predatory pricing
was in 1980 in Hoffman-La Roche.90 La Roche, in response to price competi-
tion from rival firms, gave a six months supply of valium free to hospitals. The
offer was repeated for a second six months. Evidence showed that the defend-
ant said that "this tactic will not only abort (the rival's efforts) but serve as a
warning to others who seem to be showing an interest in this product," and
"the pipeline would be kept filled." Over the period of the indictment, La
Roche sold 41 million capsules of Valium and gave away 174 million. The
Court held that the one year give away constituted a policy in contrast to an
isolated incident which would be an acceptable competitive strategy. Because
87 Id.
88 The conduct includes: selective price cutting to eliminate or restrict the growth of
a competitor or to prevent entry; freight equalization by major firms on the plant of a
new entrant, full-line forcing, market saturating advertising to eliminate, or restrict the
growth of a competitor or to prevent entry, and conduct which is a criminal offence
under the Act or could be the subject of an order under civil provisions. Apparently the
draft legislation referred to, supra note 6, provides that an "abuse of dominant posi-
tion" will be a civil wrong to be tried in the courts. See McQuaig, supra note 6 at 37.
89 Caves, supra note 10 at 522.
90(1981), 48 C.P.R. (2d) 145, 109 D.L.R. (3d) 5 (Ont. H.C.).
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there was no evidence whether anyone other than La Roche was adversely af-
fected by the policy, the Crown relied on the above statements of La Roche to
show that the defendants intended to lessen competition substantially. The
Court concluded that zero price is unreasonably low, looking not only at the
level of price, but the length of time, whether it was a defensive move, and
whether there was any economic justification.
The definition of unreasonably low prices was considered in Consumers
Glass in 1981. The Crown alleged that Portion Packaging, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Consumers Glass sold plastic lids at prices below cost to
eliminate a new competitor, Amhil Enterprises Ltd.91 O'Leary J. of the On-
tario Supreme Court acquitted the accused, holding that their conduct was loss
minimizing in that, at no time did they price below average variable cost, de-
mand was shrinking, and there was excess capacity. He also found that the
defendant did not intend to drive Amhil out of the market.
O'Leary J. appears to adopt the criterion of average variable cost. If the
price exceeds the firm's average variable cost, it cannot be predatory pricing.
The appropriate standard has been the subject of academic debate and judicial
decisions in the United States. The view of Areeda and Turner is that any price
above short run marginal cost (SRMC) is not predatory.92 A monopolist pric-
ing below SRMC should be presumed to have engaged in a predatory practice.
In practical terms, they propose average variable cost as a useful surrogate for
marginal cost. As long as the price is above SRMC the firm is contributing
something to its fixed costs and therefore it should not shut down. Another
view is that pricing below average total cost is predatory if accompanied by
substantial evidence of predatory intent. This, however, would tend to
discourage price competition.
Economists have argued that predatory pricing almost never occurs
because a rational firm realizes that it involves certain losses today against
uncertain gains in the future. The gains are particularly uncertain because, ac-
cording to some economists, predatory pricing is never effective in eliminating
a rival. 93 Even if correct these conclusions do not necessarily imply that
Canada's predatory pricing provision should be repealed, particularly in light
of the adoption of SRMC as the threshold for predatory pricing. The treat-
ment of economic evidence in Consumers Glass indicates lower Canadian
courts may be abandoning their former mechanistic approach.
Section 34(1)(b) is sometimes referred to as regional price discrimination,
but a better description is predatory price discrimination, that is, price
discrimination injurious to the competitors of the discriminating seller. The
section prohibits sellers from engaging in a policy of selling products or serv-
ices in one region in Canada at a price lower than in another region with the in-
tent or effect of lessening competition substantially or of eliminating a com-
petitor.
91R. v. Consumers Glass (1981), 57 C.P.R. (2d) 1, 124 D.L.R. (3d) 274 (Ont.
H.C.).
92 Areeda and Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act (1975), 88 Harvard L. Rev. 697.
93 Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counter-strategies (1981), 48 U. of
Chicago L. Rev. 263.
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While predatory price discrimination is the best description of the section,
it is not a completely accurate one. The section does not fit neatly into either
the definition of predatory pricing or price discrimination. Price discrimina-
tion focuses on the relationship between the price to the customer and prices to
competitors of the customer. Are they paying the same price? Price
discrimination is directed at the practice of discrimination between customers
on the basis of their preference; those who value the product more, pay more
for it. The injury to be prevented is the injury to the competitors of the pur-
chasers. Predatory pricing focuses on the relationship between the cost of the
product and the selling price. Is the seller pricing below cost with the intent to
exclude or discipline a competitor? The object is to prevent injury to the com-
petition among the seller and its rivals. While subsection 34(1)(b) asks whether
customers are paying the same price in different regions, it is directed at
preventing anticompetitive effects to rivals of the seller. On the other hand, it
is not concerned with the relationship between the costs to the seller and the
price. The question is whether such a provision is necessary when there are
separate provisions prohibiting predatory pricing and price discrimination.
In the United States, primary-line discrimination (price discrimination in-
jurious to the competitors of the discriminating seller) under section 2 of the
Clayton Act, has been collapsed into predatory pricing in section 2 of the Sher-
man Act. 94 Although the wording of the amended section 2 of the Clayton Act
does not require pricing below cost or a showing of market power, as is re-
quired by the Sherman Act, judicial decisions have equated the Clayton Act
standard with that of the Sherman Act and both are often required for
primary-line price discrimination. Thus, the Canadian section 34(1)(b) is
stricter than the American law because it does not require market power if
there is an intent to lessen competition substantially or eliminate a competitor,
and does not require below cost pricing.
Although Section 34(1)(b) does not require below cost pricing, it does
have a function in that it combats persistent price discrimination. The section
requires that there be a "policy" of regional price discrimination. In R. v. Car-
nation Co., 95 Carnation sold evaporated milk at a lower price in Alberta and
British Columbia than in Ontario. One of Carnation's competitors, Alpha, cut
prices in British Columbia. Carnation responded by cutting its price in both
British Columbia and Alberta. The Crown alleged that Carnation's price cuts
were designed to discipline Alpha for engaging in various non-price com-
petitive practices such as secret discounts, drop shipments and co-operative
advertising allowances. The Court held that the discriminatory prices were a
"temporary expedient to meet an aggressive competitor" and did not con-
stitute a "policy" as required by section 34(1)(b). In the absence of evidence
that Carnation was pricing below cost, a requirement of a policy of discrimina-
tion may be sensible. Economists have pointed out that persistent price
discrimination could increase the profitability of cartels, increase expenditures
on monopolizing and distort the allocation of resources. On the facts Carna-
tion was cutting prices to bring about a cartel agreement. In this case, Carna-
94 Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 551 F. 2d 790 (10th
Cir. 1977); Janish Bros. Inc. v. American Distilling Co. 570 F. 2d 848 (9th Cir. 1978).
95 [1969] 4 D.L.R. (2d) 133, 58 C.P.R. 112 (Ont. C.A.).
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tion should have been charged with conspiracy to lessen competition unduly
rather than predatory price discrimination. 
96
C. Mergers
The Canadian provision governing mergers is regarded by some as almost
totally ineffectual. Section 33 prohibits mergers whereby "competition is or is
likely to be lessened to the detriment of ... the public. . . ." Critics point out
that only six cases have been prosecuted since 1910 and there has been only one
conviction. In that case the accused pleaded guilty. The two decisions which
indicate that the section is unenforceable are the acquittals in the Canadian
Breweries and B.C. Sugar cases in 1960Y In the Breweries case the accused
had expanded market share by a series of takeovers over almost thirty years ac-
quiring sixty percent of the beer market in Ontario and forty-six percent in
Quebec. In the B. C. Sugar case the merger gave the company one hundred per-
cent of the market for refined sugar in British Columbia, Alberta and Saskat-
chewan and three-quarters of the market in Manitoba. Yet in both cases, the
courts held there was no detriment to the public.
In 1976, the Supreme Court of Canada in K. C. Irving removed any doubt
about the correctness of the Breweries and Sugar cases. 98 A series of acquisi-
tions resulted in one company owning all five English-language daily
newspapers in New Brunswick. Although the mergers had resulted in a
monopoly, the Supreme Court held that the Crown had not shown that the
mergers had caused public detriment. The Court refused to infer public detri-
ment from the one hundred percent market share of the accused.
The lack of judicial restraint of mergers was accompanied by an increase
in the number and size of mergers, particularly in the period 1978 to 1981.
From 1970 to 1978 the average number of mergers was 380. The number
jumped to 511 in 1978, and 414 in 1980. In at least fifty-five mergers from 1978
to 1981, the transaction value exceeded $100 million and in nineteen mergers
the value exceeded $400 million. 99 This list includes horizontal, vertical and
conglomerate mergers. The level of activity does not imply that the impact on
96 Porter J.A. dissenting in the Ontario Court of Appeal thought Carnation had
been successful in reaching an agreement. He noted, in reference to meetings between
the competitors, that "All of them left the meetings with the impression that when the
objectionable trade practices had been eliminated the price would be restored. No one
said that, but everybody understood that. In due course when the practices were aban-
doned the prices did go up and all again sold at the same price." Id. at 140.
"The accused pleaded guilty in R. v. Electric Reduction Co. of Canada, supra
note 72. The accused were acquitted in R. v. Canadian Breweries Ltd. (1960), 34 C.P.R.
179, 126 C.C.C. 133 (Ont. H.C.) and R. v. British Columbia Sugar Refining Company
Ltd. et al., supra note 74.98Supra note 2. See Reschenthaler and Stanbury, Benign Monopoly: Canadian
Merger Policy and the K. C. Irving Case (1977), 2 Can. Bus. L.J. 135; MacCrimmon and
Stanbury, "The Reform of Canada's Merger Law and the Provisions of Bill C-13," in
Rowley and Stanbury, eds., Competition Policy in Canada (Ottawa: Institute on
Research on Public Policy, 1978) at 65; Calms, Monopoly: Detriment to the Public,
and the K.C. Irving Case (1981), 30 U. of New Brunswick L.J. 167; Cairns, Merger
Policy in Canada and the Supreme Court's Decision in K.C. Irving Ltd. (1981), 19
Alberta L. Rev. 303; Roberts, The Death of Competition Policy: Monopoly, Merger
andR. v. K.C. IrvingLtd. (1977), 16 U. of West. Ont. L. Rev. 215.
99 Stanbury, supra note 52.
[VOL. 21, No. 4
Anti-Competitive Behaviour
the economy was detrimental, but it does suggest the need for some kind of
record keeping and assessment of the costs and benefits. It is apparent from
the data, for example, that horizontal mergers have greatly increased concen-
tration in several industries such as meat packing, poultry processing, major
appliances, forest products, and department stores. 1
Another effect of the increase in merger activity is the concentration on
the buying side of the market. The creation of monopsonies and oligopsonies
through mergers are a growing problem. For example, recent acquisitions by
the Hudson's Bay Company, have made the Bay the largest retailer in Canada
with at least thirty-five percent of the full-service department store market.
The Bay has a massive purchasing power which places considerable pressure
on suppliers.101 The courts have tended to ignore factor market concentration
as seen in the lack of concern about the monosony power of the defendant
sugar companies in B. C. Sugar.
Representatives of the Canadian business community do not agree that
the existing merger law is ineffectual. 1°2 The Business Council on National
Issues, for example, argues that some mergers have been deterred and even
that the existing law prevents mergers which would make Canadian firms more
competitive in the international market. The Council would rely to a great ex-
tent on the market to discipline management who enter into inefficient
mergers. They recommend review by the Commission of those mergers whose
effects are "major and national in consequences." The Commission would
decide whether a substantial lessening of competition may be justified by "ef-
ficiency and international competitive realities" which indicates it would be
"for the overall benefit to Canada."
10 3
There have been several government proposals to change the rules govern-
ing mergers based on the view that the merger law has been ineffectual. 104 The
April 1981 proposal adopts an approach based on the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm of industrial organization economics which predicts
that the conduct of the individual firms in a market will be controlled by the
structure of that market. 105 Mergers which would result in a firm accounting
for more than a certain percentage share of the market would be subject to a
remedial order of the court. The specific percentage to be codified was to be
set after consultation with business persons and academics. The courts could
either prohibit the merger or permit it subject to certain conditions which
100 Stanbury, The Need for New Merger Legislation, unpublished paper, 1983 and
Khemani, supra note 10.
101 See Director of Investigation and Research, AnnualReport, 1979 at 21-25.
102 Business Council on National Issues, A Consideration of Possible Amendments
to the Combines Investigation Act (Ottawa: Business Council on National Issues, 1981).
See Stanbury, The BCNI Study on Competition Policy: A Review (1981), 2 Can. Com-
petition Policy Record 15 (No. 3).
103 Id. at 27.
104 See supra note 5.
105 See for example, Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Perform-
ance (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1980). Apparently the draft legislation is dramatically
different from the Minister's proposals. The structural test has been eliminated. The
merger must be shown to "lessen competition substantially" and there is an efficiency
defence. In addition there is provision for an appeal to the Cabinet to overturn merger
decisions of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission. See McQuaig, supra note 6 at
37.
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would "ensure that the merger did not result in a dominant position in any
particular market." Mergers which resulted in a market share below that
threshold were to be assessed to determine if they were likely to lessen actual or
potential competition significantly. No guidelines were set out for this evalua-
tion.
The Canadian proposal is to be contrasted with the new merger guidelines
issued by the United States Department of Justice in June, 1982; the first revi-
sion of the guidelines since 1968.106 The structural rule of the 1968 Guidelines
has been modified and an inquiry into whether market share accurately reflects
the market power of the merged firm is now required for mergers with a post
merger Herfindahl Index between 1000 and 1800.107
The Department begins with an assumption that these mergers are
"beneficial or neutral" and that "mergers generally play an important role in
a free enterprise economy." They are not concerned with preventing increased
concentration as an end in itself, but of controlling market power. 108 They do
not assume there is a causal connection between concentration and prices or
profitability. Even if there is a correlation and profitability increases with con-
centration, that profitability can be brought about by efficiencies and not by
supra-competitive prices. This is in sharp contrast to the 1968 Guidelines
which included as one of the objectives, "preventing significant increases in
concentration in a market," and "preserving significant possibilities for even-
tual deconcentration in a concentrated market." There is no reference in the
1982 Guidelines to concentration trends, although the Herfindahl Index
measure of concentration will flag mergers in less concentrated industries more
often than in highly concentrated industries. 109
Abandonment of the structural approach in relation to some mergers re-
quires an assessment of the characteristics of the market and the behaviour of
the firms to predict whether the merger will result in control over prices. The
factors set out in the Guidelines relate to market power: ease of entry, the
nature of the product and the terms of the sale, information about specific
transactions, buyer market characteristics, and conduct of firms in the market.
The structural approach has not been completely abandoned. There are
still a group of mergers which the department will always challenge - those in
which the post merger Herfindahl Index is above 1800. Thus it may be argued
that the proposed structural approach in Canada is not that different from the
106 One striking contrast between the American Guidelines and the Canadian pro-
posals is the clear statement in the United States Guidelines of the purpose of merger
regulation and the analysis of the factors which are relevant in assessing whether that
purpose will be furthered by prohibition of the merger. The law is directed at preventing
"the likelihood that one firm or a small group of firms could successfully exercise
market power." Market power is defined as the "ability of one or more firms to main-
tain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time .... "
107 The Herfindahl index is a measure of industry concentration obtained by squar-
ing the percentage share of each firm and then summing these squared values. Thus five
firms, each with a 20% share, would have a Herfindahl Index of 2000.
108 The Federal Trade Commission, in contrast, in an announcement made concur-
rently with the issuance of the Guidelines, does refer to "concentration trends" as a fac-
tor in evaluating the impact of a merger.
09See Weinstock, Using the Herf!indahl Index to Measure Concentration (1982),
27 Antitrust Bul. 285 at 289.
[VOL. 21, NO. 4
Anti-Competitive Behaviour
1982 Guidelines. There may be a real difference, however, in the analysis of
mergers in the middle area where they are not presumed to be harmful. First,
the analysis recommended by the United States Department of Justice
Guidelines is much more sophisticated than any analysis which has been done
either by the courts or the Commission in Canada, and there may be doubt
about their ability to apply such analysis. Canadian courts, in contrast to the
Americans', have demonstrated a general reluctance to consider economic
evidence." 0 For example, in Canadian Breweries, the trial judge viewed the
highly concentrated oligopolistic structure of the beer industry without alarm,
describing the market in Ontario as consisting of "three strong
competitors."'M Although he did state that the danger of mergers is the
resulting power to enhance prices, there is no examination of the market power
of the merged firm other than a statement as to the market share percentages.
He seemed oblivious to the impact of entry barriers on market power or the
possibility that the oligopolistic market structure will facilitate collusive
behaviour. This result is perhaps not surprising in the light of the Commission
Report which also did not see harm in permitting the merger to continue.
11 2 If
a panel of persons specializing in merger regulation did not find harm, why
should a court?
Second, the Canadian rule may require an examination not only of the
impact on competition but an evaluation of the broader macro economic ef-
fects. Perhaps, as some have suggested, the smaller Canadian economy
necessitates an evaluation of such factors as the ability to compete in interna-
tional markets, unemployment, capital investment, innovation, technological
diffusion, and research and development investment. The proposed amend-
ments do not list the factors which will be examined. "
3
Apparently, the Canadian government does not plan in the 1983 session
of Parliament to make a legislative attempt to provide workable, effective
merger rules. The plan of the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs to
introduce extensive amendments to the Combines Investigation Act at the
February, 1983 session of Parliament did not materialize.' " It appears the
latest reform proposals have gone the way of all previous attempts and, inef-
fectual or not, the current merger provisions continue to be the law.
1. Enforcement
In contrast to enforcement measures in the United States, there is no pro-
vision for pre-merger notification or for consent orders. 115 The Director has an
110 Supra note 1.
I Supra note 97.
2 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Manufacture, Distribution and Sale of
Beer in Canada, 1955.
113 Bill C-13, 1977, s. 31.71(4) listed the following factors: substitute products,
competition from imports, trend of concentration, size of firms, barriers to entry,
history of growth by merger or anti-competitive conduct, intent to reduce competition,
foreclosure of factor inputs and outlets, potential entrants, innovation, failing firm, ef-
fect on competition, and other factors "relevant to competition."
14 Supra note 7. The Bill was drafted and printed together with its explanatory
material. It remains only to introduce it. See, supra note 6.
' 5 Supra notes 39 and 41. The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C.
ss. 16(b)-(h). Provisions on pre-merger notification and consent orders were proposed
in Bill C-42 and C-13 in 1977, but neither passed.
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informal programme of compliance whereby firms may voluntarily ask for his
view on a proposed merger. The Director also keeps a merger register, has
issued brief merger guidelines, and monitors merger activity. It appears that
some mergers have been discouraged by these informal procedures. 116 In one
case the Director has required undertakings from the acquiring firm which
would substantially limit that firm's power to influence the operations of the
target firm. The arrangement was concurred in by the Deputy Attorney-
General of Canada. The Director takes the view that the breach of this agree-
ment may be enforced by injunction although he has not expressly been given
the power to require undertakings.117
2. Mergers with Foreign Firms
In contrast to the almost nonexistent impact of the rules on domestic
mergers, the rules governing takeovers by foreign firms are much more
stringent. Foreign firms which contemplate merging with a Canadian firm or
establishing a new business in Canada must meet criteria established by the
Foreign Investment Review Act."18 The Act sets up the Foreign Investment
Review Agency (FIRA) which scrutinizes all such activities to assess whether
they confer "significant benefits" on Canada and to make a report to the
116 Gorecki, supra note 42 at 205.
7 Annual Report, supra note 45 (The Hudson's Bay, Simpson, Simpsons-Sears
Merger).
Il8S.C. 1973-74 c. 46. Acquisitions of Canadian business enterprises and the
establishment of new businesses in Canada by foreign individuals is regulated by the
Foreign Investment Review Act which was proclaimed in April, 1974. The stated pur-
pose of the Act is to ensure that such acquisitions and new businesses occur only when
they confer significant benefits on Canada. The Act establishes the Foreign Investment
Review Agency which reviews the applications by foreign individuals and advises the
Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce on the likelihood of significant benefit if the
application is approved. It also performs surveillance and enforcement functions and
conducts general research on foreign investment in Canada. "Non-eligible persons"
must file a formal application to the Agency in certain situations. Non-eligible persons
include not only non-Canadian citizens but also Canadian citizens if they are not or-
dinarily resident in Canada, or are prescribed by regulation, and landed immigrants in
Canada if they did not apply for citizenship in the year following the time they became
eligible to do so. Non-eligible persons also includes foreign governments, subdivisions,
and agencies, and corporations, incorporated in Canada or elsewhere which are con-
trolled in fact by a non-eligible person or a group, one of which is such a person. Situa-
tions in which a non-eligible person must file an application includes acquisitions in
which the gross assets are greater than $250,000 or the gross revenue will be greater than
$3,000,000. It also includes acquisitions below these limits if the non-eligible person
controls an unrelated established Canadian business. New businesses unrelated to an ex-
isting business of the non-eligible person in Canada also require an application. In
1981-82 there were 338 applications for acquisitions. Target firms with assets of less
than $2 million accounted for 59.5%. Seventy-eight per cent involved firms with less
than 100 employees. If we eliminate the one case involving assets of more than $5.5
billion, the total value of assets of the targets dropped from the previous year by about
$.5 billion. Services accounted for 57% of the cases, manufacturing 39%, and the
resource sector 4%. Applications of U.S. firms dropped to 58% from 64% in 1980-81,
while the Western European share increased from 31 to 34%. Foreign Investment
Review Agency, AnnualReport, 1981-82. Significant benefit is judged by the following
factors: (1) effect on economic activity in Canada including employment, resource pro-
cessing, use of Canadian products and services and exports, (2) participation by Cana-
dians, (3) effect on productivity, efficiency, technological development, innovation,
and product variety, (4) effect on competition, (5) compatibility with national in-
dustrial and economic policies.
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Cabinet which makes the final decision. The anticompetitive impact of the
merger is only one of the factors to be taken into account and in practice has
proved not to be as important as other factors such as employment of Cana-
dians and use of Canadian products. The broad discretion of the Cabinet to
approve or disapprove applications by foreign firms and the practice of requir-
ing undertakings, for example, to purchase Canadian goods, has become a
source of concern, particularly to American firms. The matter is currently be-
ing considered by a panel set up under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade in Geneva. 11 9 Under the existing rules the Director has jurisdiction to in-
vestigate mergers which are subject to review by FIRA, but it is highly unlikely
that the Director will challenge a merger which has been approved by the
Cabinet.
D. Vertical Restraints: Resale Price Maintenance, Refusal to Supply and
Exclusive Dealing
Three types of restraints on distribution which, in practice, are often
observed together are resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing, and ter-
ritorial restrictions. All three may be enforced by refusals to supply. Resale
price maintenance is a criminal offence under the Canadian Act. Exclusive
dealing and territorial restrictions are civil reviewable matters heard by the
Commission. 120 Refusals to supply can be treated both as a criminal offence
and as a civil reviewable matter. 12 1 Due to time and space limitations, ter-
ritorial restrictions will not be discussed. While it is a potentially important
provision, no inquiries have been initiated by the Director. 1
22
1. Resale Price Maintenance: Acquisition of Market Power through
Agreement
While economists generally agree that price agreements among firms on
the same level of distribution (horizontal price fixing) have no positive effects
on competition, there is continuing controversy over the effects of price
agreements among firms on different levels of distribution, that is, vertical
price agreements or resale price maintenance. In the United States, until
recently, it was generally accepted that resale price maintenance had the
necessary "pernicious effect" to classify it as illegal per se. 12 3 However, in the
fall of 1982, William Baxter, Assistant Attorney-General, Antitrust Division
119 See Paterson, The GATT and Restrictions on Foreign Investment: The United
States Challenge to Canada's Foreign Investment Law (1982), 1 U.C.L.A. Pacific Basin
Law Journal 224. In June 1983, the practice of FIRA to require the purchase of Cana-
dian products and services was ruled contrary to Article III of the GATT (National
Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation).
I" Resale Price Maintenance: s. 38(l)(a); Exclusive Dealing: s. 31.4(2); Market
Restrictions: s. 31.4(3).
121 S. 38(I)(b); s. 31.2.
1 2 Market restrictions are prohibited if engaged in by a major supplier or if the
practice is widespread and is likely to lessen competition substantially. S. 31.4(4) ex-
empts restrictions engaged in for a reasonable amount of time to facilitate entry of a
new supplier or product.
123 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 71 S. Ct. 259
(1951). See Russell Stover Candies Inc. (1982) CCH Trade Reg. Rep. para. 21, 933
(FTC) for an example of a decision holding resale price maintenance to be illegal per se.
Chairman James Miller dissented emphasizing the need to examine procompetitive
impact.
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of the Department of Justice issued a statement calling for treatment of resale
price maintenance under the rule of reason. He argued that while elimination
of resale price maintenance by a firm may result in a short run price drop, this
price drop may suppress "investment incentives for new complex products."
Analysis under the rule of reason would permit a court to determine when
elimination of intrabrand competition through resale price maintenance was
"essential to the attainment of important long range goals." 124
In Canada, resale price maintenance and refusal to supply have been il-
legalperse since 1951. The provisions have been actively enforced. There have
been sixty-four cases resulting in convictions in the period 1951 to 1981 with
most of the convictions occurring in the past decade. The average fine in 1981
was $36,500. The largest fine, $150,000, was received by Levi Strauss in 1979.
Prohibition orders enjoining future misconduct by firms are not unusual. 125
Should manufacturers and suppliers be permitted to place restrictions on
price competition in the distribution of goods and services? A manufacturer of
home computers may wish to encourage its distributors to provide services
such as demonstrations, and educational displays. One incentive is to eliminate
competition from other distributors of the same brand of computer by main-
taining uniform resale prices. Should the manufacturer be permitted to send
out a suggested retail price list, to advertise this price, to persuade dealers
through a variety of means such as discounts to charge the suggested price, or
to refuse to supply a dealer who discounts the product?
a) Economic Rationale
At first glance it is difficult to understand why a manufacturer would
want to maintain a high resale price. Since a higher retail price often reduces
the demand for the product, the manufacturer should be motivated to keep the
difference between the dealer's cost and the retail price to a minimum by en-
couraging price competition among dealers. The persistence of manufacturers
in engaging in the practice, despite this reasoning, raises the question of
whether the effect of resale price maintenance is always anticompetitive.
There is disagreement among economists about the competitive effect of
resale price maintenance. Some economists have suggested two reasons for
restrictions on price competition, only one of which justifies prohibition of the
activity. 12
6
One explanation is that the manufacturer is being used by the dealers to
enforce a horizontal price fixing agreement among the dealers. When a dealer
breaches the agreement by charging a lower price, the dealers may ask the
manufacturer to threaten to cut off that dealer unless it charges the suggested
124(1982) CCH Trade Reg. Reporter, para. 50,442. See also the comments of
William Baxter on October 4, 1983 on price and non-price restrictions imposed by
airlines on travel agents. [1983 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) para. 50,454.
125 Stanbury, supra note 52.
126 Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 61, at 147-67. Clarkson and Miller, Industrial
Organization: Theory, Evidence and Public Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982)
303-17.
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retail price. The manufacturer faces being cut off by all the dealers if it does
not comply. 127
A second explanation given by economists is that restriction of price com-
petition between dealers increases non-price competition and thus stimulates
the provision of services at the retail level. 128 The producer of home computers
may think that point-of-sale services, such as computer experts to demonstrate
the various models, will increase the demand for the product. There is no in-
centive for a dealer to provide these services, however, unless it can recover
them in the form of a higher retail price. The dealer will not be able to charge a
higher price if there are other dealers selling at a discount. These other dealers
are able to save the cost of providing services and information by free-riding
on the full service dealers. In other words the discount dealer can send the
customer to the full service dealer to acquire information and then the
customer is motivated to return to the discounting seller to make the purchase.
Facing this competition, the full service dealer will reduce the amount of serv-
ice it provides.
William Baxter adopted this view of resale price maintenance and con-
cluded that it should be prohibited only if it facilitates horizontal agreements
either among manufacturers or dealers. 129 Some economists see an additional
harm in that resale price maintenance may prevent the efficient adaptation of
distribution channels to consumers' demands. Scherer, in contrast to the
Chicago school and William Baxter, thinks that the free-rider problem is
minimal. 130 Others argue that restrictions on dealer competition "enable a
manufacturer to increase the preference for his brand thus giving monopoly
power." 131 Some conclude that resale price maintenance "must at least raise
the prices of some goods in some shops above what they would otherwise
be." 132 This, of course, does not refute arguments based on the provision of
services since manufacturers do not assert that prices will be lower, but that
consumers are receiving a valuable service for which they should pay.
It is conceded by proponents and opponents that resale price maintenance
does raise retail prices. The question is whether the extra margin gained by
retailers through elimination of intrabrand competition has the effect of in-
127 Such a request may be made even if there is no horizontal agreement by dealers
whereby they threaten to discontinue stocking the product unless a low pricing com-
petitor is brought into line. A manufacturer may comply in order to avoid losing a
distributor and thus exposure to the market. See Combines Investigation Act, s. 38(6).
12 See Continental T. V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (Sylvania).
Mr. Justice White, dissenting, refused to move way from the per se rule for territorial
restrictions, arguing that the right of businesses to control the terms on which they trade
their goods was "more deeply imbedded in our cases than the notions of 'free rider' ef-
fects and distributional efficiencies borrowed by the majority from the 'new economics'
of vertical relationships."
129 Supra note 9.
130 Scherer, supra note 105 at 592 n. 103.
131 See Comanor, Vertical Integration and Customer Relations (1968), 81 Harv. L.
Rev. 1419 who argues that restrictions on dealer competition "enable a manufacturer to
increase the preference for his brand thus giving monopoly power."
13 2Neale, supra note 32 at 250.
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creasing the level of services supplied to such an extent that competition be-
tween brands is increased. Proponents and opponents also agree that resale
price maintenance should not be used to facilitate horizontal agreements. The
appropriate rule for Canada may be dictated by the economic structure. It can
be argued that competition is unlikely to be increased by resale price
maintenance because many manufacturers form a tight oligopoly. It is much
more likely that the practice will facilitate coordinated behaviour by the
firms.133 Support for a per se rule ifi Canada is also suggested by the conclu-
sion of most economists that the practice probably does not provide much
benefit to the small retailer. 134
b) History of Canadian Legislation
Resale price maintenance, in Canada, was widespread after World War II
due principally to the "training" firms received when the Wartime Prices and
Trade Board imposed price maintenance during the war. Legislation directed
at the problem was introduced in 1951. The government reasoned that resale
price maintenance weakened pressures for greater efficiency and that the small
retailer did not require special protection. It concluded that, in any event,
small business was not protected because the high profit margins under resale
price maintenance would attract entrants to the market. In addition, competi-
tion in the form of advertising and services would take the place of price com-
petition and consume the profit margin needed by the small retailer to remain
in business. 135
Resale price maintenance is prohibited by section 38 of the Combines In-
vestigation Act. This specific provision can be contrasted with the general
statutory provisions in the United States where resale price maintenance is
viewed as an aspect of collusive conduct contrary to section 1 of the Sherman
Act which prohibits agreements to restrain trade. Several changes were made
to section 38 in 1976. Amendments extended the section to services as well as
products, to horizontal as well as vertical price maintenance, to industrial
property holders, to attempts to "influence" as well as to enforce specific
resale prices, and to credit card companies which induce retailers not to give
discounts for cash purchases.
In contrast to the judicial treatment of conspiracy to lessen competition
and merger regulation which indicates that courts do not see the "evil" effect
of the defendant's conduct, the decisions on resale price maintenance are nearly
indistinguishable from judicial treatment of other criminal offences. This may
be because, in most cases, there is an individual "victim" - the dealer who
has been coerced into maintaining a higher price or has been cut off from his
supply. There is little discussion of the economic justification either for or
against the practice other than the statements about the public's right to free
competition and the need to "maintain a free market of goods and com-
modities." 136
133 Scherer, supra note 105 at 593.
'34Skeoch, "Canada" in Yamey, (ed.), Resale Price Maintenance (London:
Weidenfeld, Nicolson, 1966) at 25-64.
135 Id. at 30. See also Thompson, Resale Price Maintenance and Refusal to Sell:
Aspects of a Problem in Competition Policy (1971), 24 U. of Toronto L.J. 67.
136R. v. Peter Campbell (1979), 51 C.P.R. (2d) 284 at 287; and see R. v. Levi
Strauss (1979), 45 C.P.R. (2d) 215 at 217.
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Section 38(1)(a) prohibits the employment of particular means to achieve
the end of influencing price upwards or discouraging the reduction of prices.
The prohibited means are agreement, threat, promise or "any like means."
These means must have the logical effect, if carried out, of influencing price.
An attempt is sufficient. The agreement or other conduct need not actually
maintain prices. 137
An executed agreement to maintain resale prices is prohibited. 38 An
agreement may be inferred from all the circumstances including any written
contracts and the conduct of all the actors in the distribution process. Agree-
ment has been inferred from the issuing of suggested resale price lists and one
request to remove discount price tags accompanied by a statement by the
defendant that it expected the dealer not to discount in the future. 139 There
must be an agreement, however, in the absence of threats or promises or any
like means. In Cluett Peabody, the Court refused to infer an agreement from
evidence of a "gentleman's agreement not to use the company name in the
advertisement offering off-price merchandising." 140 The practice of not using
the name appeared to arise from individual judgment on the part of the retailer
"that it was in everyone's best interest not to do so."
The Court looks at the logical effect of the agreement, not the specified
purpose. An agreement not to use a manufacturer's name in advertisements of
a discount sale of its product was found to be an agreement to "indirectly...
discourage the reduction of prices." 141 An agreement to reimburse a propor-
tion of the cost of advertising on the condition that the list price of the
manufacturer be specified in the advertisement was contrary to the section. 142
137R. v. Campbell (1964), 46 D.L.R. (2d) 83 (Ont. C.A.). Prior to 1976, the section
referred to means "to induce or require" another to maintain prices. The section now
refers to means "to influence upward or discourage" reduction in price. Inducement
has been defined as means used "to persuade, influence, or to prevail upon someone to
do something they would not otherwise have done." R. v. William Coutts Co. Ltd.
(1968) 67 D.L.R. (2d) 87. Since influencing appears to encompass the other two means,
the drafting change should have little effect on future decisions. Prior to 1976 the sec-
tion referred to prices specified by the manufacturer, while the new legislation refers
simply to influencing "price." Thus a general agreement not to discount without speci-
fying prices, which may not have been caught by the prior legislation (see Coutts), is
now caught. Section 38(l)(a) has been described as "a very wide section" and perhaps
"some amendment might be necessary at some future time when sufficient language is
found to make it clearer." Peter Campbell, supra note 135, at 287.
138R. v. Kito Canada Ltd. (1975), 22 C.P.R. (2d) 275 (Man. Q.B.).
139R. v. Rolex Watch Co. of Canada Ltd. (1978), 44 C.P.R. (2d) 39 (Ont. Co. Ct.),
(1981), 50 C.P.R. (2d) 222 (Ont. C.A.). The Director's AnnualReport, 1978, contains a
copy of the prohibition order at 28-29. There was evidence the Company issued sug-
gested retail price lists and that on one occasion two representatives of the company had
asked the manager of the dealer to remove discount price tags. This was done and
described in a letter from Rolex to the dealer in which the manager was described as
"very cooperative." The manager testified that no promises, inducements or threats
had been made at that time and there was no evidence of an agreement between the
companies. Still Cartwright Co. Ct. J. held that Rolex through its representatives "by
agreement induced (the dealer) to resell Rolex ... watches at the suggested retail prices
specified by the accused at that time."
140R. v. Cluett, Peabody, Canada Inc. (1982), 64 C.P.R. (2d) 30 at 38.
1411d. at 37.
142R. v. A & MRecords (1981), 51 C.P.R. (2d) 115 (Ont. Co. Ct.), appeal to Ont.
C.A. dismissed, 71 C.P.R. (2d) 280.
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The threat which influences the dealer may be implicit. It has been suffi-
cient for a defendant manufacturer to present a discounting dealer with a
resale price program. 143 A promise to supply a discounting retailer who has
been trying to secure a supply for many months is a sufficient inducement or
influence over prices. 144 A threat is sufficient, the dealer need not be cut off. 145
The Crown does not have to show a specific intent to influence prices. The
court looks at the projected effect of the agreement on price level and not the
expressed purpose of the defendants. An agreement to reimburse a proportion
of the cost of advertising if the list price of the manufacturer was specified in
the advertisement was held to be an attempt to induce to sell at a higher
price. 146 The defendant's argument that their purpose was to induce the dealer
not to advertise at a lower price and not to affect the actual selling price was
held to be irrelevant. The agreement had the effect of "exerting an influence
upon or creating an inducement to resell at not less than the price
designated."' 147 Thus the innocent purposes of the defendants are "beside the
point." 148
The practice of "suggesting" a resale price is regulated by section 38(3).
In 1966 Skeoch concluded that there was a widespread practice of attaching
retail prices to a product without a qualification that there is no obligation to
pay that price. 149 Section 38(3) and (4) are an attempt to require suppliers to
make such a qualification. Section 38(3) provides that suggesting a resale price
is "proof of an attempt to influence" the price upwards unless the defendant
shows it was clear that the retailer was under no obligation to follow the sug-
gestion.
Section 38(4) was considered in Philips Electronics'50 in 1981 which held
that advertising a suggested retail price was not an attempt to influence prices
by a means set out in the section. The Court held that it did not come within
the definition of "any like means." The defendants had run an advertisement
listing the stores where their television converter could be purchased and listed
the price as "only $44.95." They did not add "or less" as had been advised by
the Director of Investigation and Research in a bulletin. 51
143 Sunbeam Corp. v. The Queen [19691 S.C.R. 221, 56 C.P.R. 242 (S.C.C.).
144R. v. H.D. Lee of Canada (1981), 57 C.P.R. (2d) 186 (Que. Ct. Sess.).
1
45 R. v. Kito Canada Ltd., supra note 138.
'4 R. v. Campbell, supra note 137.
1
47R. v. MoffatsLtd. [1957] O.R. 93, 25 C.R. 201.
1
4 8 Per Schroeder J. in Campbell supra, note 137. The agreement consisted of a
series of arrangements between the defendant and the wholesaler and the consumer.
The defendant arranged contracts between wholesalers and consumers at a suggested
list price and in addition, arranged with the wholesalers to report on the purchases of
the consumers and to request repayment of any inappropriate discounts given. This ar-
rangement was found to have the effect of inducing the wholesaler to maintain the list
price.
1
49 Skeoch, supra note 134 at 58.
"OR. v. Philips Electronics Ltd. (1981), 116 D.L.R. (3d) 298 (Ont. C.A.), (1982),
59 C.P.R. (2d) 212 (S.C.C.).
5 Misleading Advertising Bulletin, Department of Consumer & Corporate Af-
fairs, Feb. 1976, at 5.
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The Court rejected the argument of the Crown that the effect of section
38(3) was to make the conduct of the defendant in this case contrary to section
38(1)(a). It is necessary to show an attempt to influence upwards and the at-
tempt was made in the manner proscribed. The advertisement was an attempt
but it did not come within the definition of "any like means" and there was no
evidence of an agreement, threat, or promise. The decision implies that it will
also be necessary to show that suggesting a resale price without the stipulation
in section 38(3) comes within the prohibited means. It may be that suggesting
resale prices is permissible if the firm does not engage in any coercive actions
to maintain the suggested prices.
In the United States, the prohibition of resale price maintenance was ex-
tended to consignment sales in 1969 by the decision in Simpson v. Union Oil
Co. 152 Prior to that time such sales had been exempt on the reasoning that a
rule against price maintenance was based on the dealer's common law right to
resell his own property. If title remained in the supplier, that supplier had the
right to dictate prices. 153
In Canada, resale price maintenance in consignment sales was not pro-
hibited by the Act until 1976. For example, in one Commission hearing, an oil
company retained title to the gas supplied to the dealer and specified the resale
price. There was no liability for resale price maintenance although the Com-
mission thought it was detrimental to the public interest. 154 Since the 1976
amendments, section 38 does not require a sale, but it should be noted that sec-
tion 38(2) exempts principal and agent relationships. The amendments made
consignment selling a civil reviewable matter under section 31.3. Consignment
selling "introduced" for the purpose of price maintenance or price discrimina-
tion is subject to a remedial order of the Commission that the practice cease. It
is likely that enforcement will proceed under the civil reviewable provisions
where the purposes of the supplier could be investigated.
Section 38 is not confined to vertical price agreements. In Peter Camp-
bell' 55 an attempt by the owner of a car rental agency to stop a price war and to
raise prices among car rental agencies was held to be a violation of the Act.
Section 38 is so broadly worded that, theoretically, all price fixing agreements
152 377 U.S. 13, 84 S. Ct. 1051 (1964).
I U.S. v. Colgate and Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). American caselaw has made a
distinction between unilateral refusals to supply and refusals to supply pursuant to a
resale price agreement. In Colgate, the Supreme Court held that unilateral refusals to
deal are not illegal in the absence of an agreement although the agreement may be
shown by "a course of conduct" or "tacit understandings." The court stated: "In the
absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly the act does not restrict the
long recognized right of the trader or manufacturer in an entirely private business freely
to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." In
U.S. v. Parke-Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 80 S. Ct. 503 (1960), this exception was effec-
tively narrowed to manufacturers who deal directly with retail dealers. The exception
has been described as being confined to facts that are ". . . of such doric simplicity as to
be somewhat rare in this day of complex business enterprise." George W. Warner & Co.
v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co. 277 F. 2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1960).
154 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Report on the Distribution and Sale of
Gasoline in the City of Winnipeg, June 27, 1966.
155 R. v. Peter Campbell (1979), 51 C.P.R. (2d) 284 (B.C.Co. Ct.). Horizontal price
fixing has been covered by s. 38 since 1976.
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could be prosecuted under section 38 instead of section 32, the provision on
conspiracies to lessen competition unduly. Under section 38 there is no need to
show an undue lessening of competition.
2. Refusal to Supply: Section 38(1)(b)
Refusals to supply a product "because of the low pricing policy" of the
dealer or other person are illegal without demonstrating anticompetitive ef-
fects. The Act sets up four defences in section 38(9). The defendant must show
that it had reasonable cause to believe and did believe that the dealer charging
low prices engaged in any of the following practices: loss-leadering, "bait(ing)
and switch(ing)," misleading advertising, or failing to provide a reasonable
level of service. The requisite specific intent may be rebutted by evidence of
other reasons for the refusal. One supplier was acquitted on the basis that its
refusal to supply a retailer was caused by problems with inventory and
mistakes by employees not the history of discounting by the retailer. 156
An existing relationship between the supplier and dealer is not necessary
and a potential distributor may not be refused supply because of its discoun-
ting policies. 157 This is in contrast to the United States where a supplier is free
to choose dealers, and may refuse to supply a potential distributor if it will not
adopt the pricing policies of the supplier. 158
The reasonable level of services provided by the dealer is determined by
the services which a purchaser might expect, not the level expected by the sup-
plier. Thus a supplier could not refuse to supply because of the level of services
provided by a distributor of jeans when the supplier had not received com-
plaints from customers about the lack of dressing rooms and neat displays in
the stores. 159
A supplier may refuse to supply a dealer who is engaging in loss-leadering,
that is, selling the product below cost. This defence was added to the legisla-
tion in 1960 in response to the criticism that the 1951 provisions prohibiting
resale price maintenance permitted loss-leadering.160 Two reasons for the pro-
hibition of loss-leadering are that it will harm the reputation of the manufac-
turer for quality and will limit the manufacturer's access to retail outlets. 16' It
156R. v. Matsushita Electric Co. of Canada Ltd., Sept. 30, 1980 (B.C.Co. Ct.)
(unreported). The Crown must show that the reason for the refusal was the low pricing
policy of the retailer. In Cluett, Peabody, Canada Inc., supra note 140, the defendant
refused to supply a discount store giving as its reason that the number and location of
retail outlets was adequate. While Wren Co. Ct. J. did not believe the defendant, and
found the reason for the refusal was the discount practices of the dealer, he states that
he would have acquitted if the defendant had established another purpose. Couts,
supra note 137, held the provisions in s. 38(9) create defences and rejected the Crown's
argument that they are mere inferences which are not applicable if there is other
evidence of the reason for refusal.
157R. v. Cluett, Peabody, Canada Inc., supra note 140.
158 See, supra note 153.
159 Id.
'66Skeoch, supra note 134, at 41. Loss-leadering is to be distinguished from
predatory pricing in section 34(1)(c) in that predatory pricing must substantially lessen
competition or be designed to have that effect.
1611d. at 35. Grant J. in Coutts, supra note 137 at 93, described the damage from
loss-leaders as follows: "Such practice may have the effect of causing other retailers to
withdraw from the sale of such product and if carried on extensively may tend to
eliminate competition and thus defeat one of the principal purposes of such Act."
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is argued that retailers will refuse to carry a product if it is being sold below
cost by another retailer. These predictions are probably overstated. Any dis-
counting practice will be temporary and even if retailers are reluctant to stock
a manufacturer's goods for the moment, prices will bounce back and the
goods will be stocked. 162 Furthermore, the widespread use of loss-leaders is not
supported by the evidence. A Canadian economist concluded that the practice
"is so unsubstantial in the circumstances of modern merchandising that it can-
not be regarded as a matter of concern." 
163
The courts have given a narrow interpretation to the loss-leader defence.
Cost has been defined by the courts as actual cost of the product which does
not include the fixed costs of doing business. Judges have recognized that a
test requiring that fixed costs be allocated to individual products would involve
a technical examination of costs.164 This approach allays some of the concern
which greeted the creation of the loss-leader defence. Economists had criti-
cized the provision on the ground that refusal to supply was permitted without
a prior finding by a court of a practice of loss-leadering and that the practice
itself was vaguely defined. 165
3. Exclusive Dealing
Exclusive dealing is a requirement by a supplier that distributors not
handle goods of rival suppliers. It does not necessarily limit intrabrand com-
petition because the supplier need not restrict number, location or pricing
policies of distributors when it insists upon exclusive dealing.
Exclusive dealing is a civil reviewable matter under the Act. Section
31.1(4) forbids a requirement, by a major supplier or a widespread practice,
that a customer deal exclusively or primarily in a supplier's product if it is
likely to impede entry or expansion of a firm, introduction or expansion of
sales, or cause any other exclusionary effect with the result that competition is
or is likely to be lessened substantially. The Commission may order that the
practice cease or make any other order it thinks necessary to overcome the ef-
fects or to stimulate competition. Exclusive dealing which is engaged in to
facilitate entry into a market is exempt. 166 In the United States, exclusive deal-
ing is specifically prohibited by section 3 of the Clayton Act. 167 It is also an un-
fair trade practice under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and is
subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act. Cases under section 3, before the deci-
sion in Tampa Electric Nashville Coal Co. 168 in 1961, adopted a purely quan-
titative approach deciding on the basis of the degree to which competition was
foreclosed. The question was whether a "substantial proportion of commerce
was affected."
162 Scherer, supra note 105, at 592.
163 Skeoch, supra note 134, at 61.
164 Philips Electronics, supra note 150, at 227-28 and H.D. Lee of Canada Ltd.
supra note 144, at 196. In H.D. Lee the defendant's argument that loss-leadering exists
when the dealer sells low to advertise was rejected.
165 Skeoch, supra note 134, at 40.
166 S. 31.4(4)(a).
1
67 Supra note 75.
168 Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. 365 U.S. 320, 81 S. Ct. 623 (1961).
See Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (New York: Basic Books, 1978) at 300.
19831
604 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 21, NO. 4
Tampa Electric and the subsequent decision in GTE Sylvania,169 a deci-
sion on territorial restrictions, indicates that a more flexible approach, using
economic analysis to assess whether the effect of such conduct will be efficient
or exclusionary, will be adopted. Thus the court could look at whether promo-
tional activities, services, or repair facilities have been increased. The impact
on interbrand competition versus intrabrand competition would be a factor.
In Canada, section 31.1(2), exclusive dealing, requires that the practice
either be engaged in by a "major supplier" or be widespread in the market.
This is analogous to American case law which refers to "a dominant position
in a market . . . (or) myriad outlets with a substantial sales volume coupled
with an industry wide practice of relying upon exclusive contracts." 170 The
definition of major supplier was considered in the only case to be decided by
the Commission under this provision: Bombardier Ltd. 171 The Commission
held that the exclusive dealing arrangements of Bombardier did not lessen
competition or would not be likely to do so given the ease of entry by dealers
and the expansion of sales and dealerships by rival firms.
The Commission equated major supplier and market power. The question
is whether the firm's actions will "have an appreciable or significant impact on
the market where it sells." While market share is important, it is not the only
factor. Additional criteria will vary from industry to industry. The Commis-
sion listed financial strength and the firm's record as an innovator as two rele-
vant characteristics. 172 Bombardier, which had thirty percent of the North
American market for snowmobiles and a strong historical position, was found
to be a major supplier.
Bombardier may be contrasted with the American case of Standard
Fashion173 in which the manufacturer entered into exclusive dealing contracts
for the supply of dress patterns. Economic theories explaining exclusive deal-
ing vary. One economic justification for exclusive dealing is that it is a means
for a supplier to prevent a distributor from free-riding on a valuable service
provided by the supplier. For example, the supplier may be the more efficient
provider of advertising. The advertising will attract customers which the
distributor can switch to a rival's product with a higher markup to the
distributor. In Standard Fashion, it is argued the supplier provided investment
in design of a pattern line, some of which would be more successful than
others. The successful pattern was easily copied and could be offered at a
lower price and still provide the dealer with a higher markup. In the absence of
an exclusive dealing agreement, the dealer could easily switch a customer to the
rival product. In Bombardier, the practice of exclusive dealing may have been
justified by the expenditures by Bombardier on innovation. The Commission
refers to the "strong participation in innovation, in trail setting and in racing
which are important in product development and brand image .... 174
169 Supra note 128.
170 Tampa Electric Co., supra note 168.
1771The case is reported in Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, AnnualReport,
March 31, 1981.
172 Id. at 37.
173 Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922). See Mar-
val, Exclusive Dealing (1982), 25 J. Law. Econ. 1.
174 Supra note 171, at 37.
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In both cases it was argued that in some towns there was only one
distributor. Bork points out that this simply means that the dealer has a
monopoly in the town and that rival manufacturers will compete to supply that
dealer. 175 If the dealer agrees to deal exclusively, it must be in the best interests
of the dealer and it follows that this is in the best interests of the consumer
since it has been shown that a monopolist who purchases at a lower price will
sell at a lower price.
4. Tied Selling
Tied selling is a civil reviewable matter under section 31.4(2), the same
section which regulates exclusive dealing. A typical tied selling arrangement
makes it a condition of purchasing one good (the tying good) that the buyer
purchase another good from the seller (the tied good). The theory of the
American courts has been that tied selling allows the seller with monopoly
power over the tying good, to obtain a second distinct monopoly of the tied
good, 176 enabling the seller to obtain monopoly profits from the sale of the tied
good. Economists have pointed out that if the two products are necessary to
provide a service, such as Xerox machines and the paper used in the machines,
the seller does not increase its profits by tying one to the other. 77 This is
because the customer is interested in the end product which is composed of
both goods and does not care how the costs are distributed between the two
products. Demand is a function of the price of the end product and sellers can
distribute this price between the two goods as they choose. If they raise the
price of the paper, they must lower the price of the machine because the higher
the price of the paper, the less consumers will be willing to pay for the use of
the machine.
Tied selling can, however, have an anticompetitive effect if it is used to
facilitate price discrimination or to create entry barriers. In one method of
price discrimination, the tied good is used to meter demand and provide infor-
mation on the elasticities of demand of different users. For example, it is
assumed that the more paper a customer uses, the greater the value of copying
service to it. A company could charge a higher price per unit of copying service
to heavier users of the service by charging a price for the paper which is in ex-
cess of the marginal cost. Another method of price discrimination is block
booking. 178 An example of block booking is a movie producer who will permit
a theater to rent a certain film only if it agrees to take a second film. For exam-
ple, it may rent what it considers to be a "winner" only if it also agrees to rent
a "dog." If the relative values of the two films are different for different
theater owners, then the practice will enable the movie producer to charge
more for the package than it could charge for the individual products.
175 Supra note 168, at 307.
176 international Salt Co. v. U.S., 332 U.S. 392, 68 S. Ct. 12 (1947). The American
rules on tied selling will be re-examined by the Supreme Court during the 1983 term in
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982) (Cert.
granted 2-28-83). The Department of Justice has submitted an amicus brief supporting
the defendant hospital's right to force patients who want surgery to use the anesthesia
service supplied by the hospital.
177Posner and Easterbrook, Antitrust, Cases, Economic Notes and Other
Materials (New York: West Pub. Co., 1981) at 802. See Clarkson, supra note 126, at
273. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem (1957), 67 Yale L.J. 19.
178 See Clarkson, supra note 126, at 276.
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Tied selling was considered by the Restrictive Trade Practices Commis-
sion in The Director v. BBM Bureau of Measurement179 in 1981. BBM
measures radio audience listening and television audience viewing in Canada.
BBM required advertisers as a condition of obtaining the 'radio data' to pur-
chase the 'television data.' Advertising agencies and station representatives
were charged a higher total price for radio and TV data purchased individually
than if both were purchased together. In other words, BBM offered the second
product at a very large discount. The Director alleged that these practices
lessened competition substantially because they raised entry barriers to new en-
trants and impeded expansion of competitors. BBM had a monopoly in the
supply of radio data reports for use in the radio advertising market, but it
faced strong competition from A.C. Nielson Company in the provision of
television data. The Commission concluded that the practice created an "un-
surmountable" (sic) entry barrier and issued an order prohibiting BBM from
continuing the practice and requiring them to charge a separate price for each
service.
Section 31.4(2) prohibits tied selling which is likely to have an exclu-
sionary effect including impeding entry or expansion of a firm or a product.
Tied selling may not create any entry barrier if there are uses for the tied prod-
uct other than in conjunction with the tying product. But in BBM, the tied
product, television data, does not have any other use. There is no substantial
group demanding television data that does not also want radio data. Therefore
the prospect was that Nielson would be forced out of the market unless it pro-
vided radio data. The Commission concluded that "(i)t is no answer to say
that Nielson is able and free to enter radio data service .... The intention of
the statute is to free the market so that the producer of any one product has
opportunity to enter and compete on a fair basis."
180
BBM relied on economic evidence to show that their pricing practices, for
example, charging $17,000 for membership and radio data, and an additional
$675 for the television data, were justifiable as two-part tariff pricing. They
argued that purchasers were really paying a membership fee which covered the
fixed costs of the services of the association and were merely being charged
marginal cost for the additional radio or television data. The Commission
assumed that this argument was related to BBM's earlier argument that the
advertising agencies were not "customers" as required by the section and did
not address the merits of the argument. It would be a valid argument in the
case in which there are large set up costs of a service and the marginal costs of
supplying the service are near zero.
The argument was accepted in the United States in Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. CBS (ASCAP).1'8 ASCAP had been granted nonexclusive rights by its
member music composers to licence nondramatic performances of their
works. Radio and television broadcasters and other users of the music pur-
chase a blanket license from ASCAP which permits them to use any of the
compositions of ASCAP's members. The fee is a percentage of total revenues
179Annual Report, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, March 31, 1982 at 29.
180 Supra note 178, at 38.
11441 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 1551 (1979). See Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy
(1946), 13 Economica (N.S.) 169; Posner, supra note 177, at 144.
[VOL. 21, No. 4
Anti-Competitive Behaviour
or a flat dollar amount which does not depend on the number or name of the
compositions used. This two-part pricing equates the marginal price with the
marginal cost of using a musical composition which is zero. The substantial in-
itial investment is covered by the access fee. There is no analysis in BBM as to
whether this reasoning applies to the pricing practices of BBM. BBM can be
distinguished on the basis that BBM had a monopoly in radio data whereas
ASCAP did not have a monopoly in licensing compositions. Each composer
retained the right to license their work. Since BBM did not face any competi-
tion from other producers of radio data there was no pressure for them to
charge a competitive price. In addition, there is no reason to think that the
marginal cost of producing data is always below average cost. Whether these
distinctions are significant requires more analysis - a process the Commis-
sion did not even begin.
V. CONCLUSION
In summing up, Canadian competition law and jurisprudence will be ex-
amined from the viewpoint of the foreign firm. First, the foreign firm
operating in Canada will be considered and then the question of the extent to
which Canadian courts and the Combines Investigation Act assert jurisdiction
over foreign firms will be addressed. The first hurdle, and a substantial one for
the foreign firms, is the required review under the Foreign Investment Review
Act of the acquisition of Canadian businesses and the establishment of new
businesses by foreign firms. Once this hurdle is overcome the firm must con-
sider the extent to which it should be concerned with the Combines Investiga-
tion Act.
The discussion of Canadian and American law may lead one to conclude
that enforcement of competition policy is not as effective in Canada. There
have been few private actions. Certainly the Director of Investigation and
Research does not have the formal enforcement powers of American ad-
ministrators. It is difficult for the Director to discover anticompetitive conduct
because there are no formal requirements for domestic firms in Canada to
notify the Director of potentially anticompetitive activity such as mergers, ex-
port agreements and joint ventures. The Director does not have formal powers
to enter into undertakings with firms to correct anticompetitive activity. This
lack of formal powers is coupled with the belief by many that conviction will
be difficult to obtain under the merger and conspiracy provisions of the Act.
Still it would be a mistake to assume that the law is ineffective. Express
agreements to fix prices by firms with a substantial market share could be suc-
cessfully prosecuted. The resale price maintenance section, which does not re-
quire a lessening of competition, has been actively enforced. The recent deci-
sions on predatory pricing and the dissenting judgments in Aetna Insurance
and Atlantic Sugar indicate that the courts are beginning to understand and
recognize the harm caused by anticompetitive conduct. The expanded jurisdic-
tion of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission to adjudicate civil
reviewable matters could become an effective enforcement mechanism, once
the constitutional issues are settled. The possibility also exists of using the Act
as a sword and making a complaint to the Director when a foreign firm thinks
another firm is acting contrary to the Act.
Canadian courts apply the principle that jurisdiction over crime is limited
to crimes committed within the territorial limits of the country. This is in con-
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trast to the American claim of jurisdiction over foreign transactions which
have a substantial and foreseeable effect on American commerce. Thus the
provisions of the Combines Investigation Act involving foreign firms are
directed at manifestations of the anticompetitive activity in Canada. The pro-
visions specifically directed at foreign firms are: refusal to sell by foreigners
(section 31.7), foreign directives to Canadians (sections 36.6 and 32.1), and
misleading advertising by foreigners (section 36(2)). The remedial powers of
the court are directed toward the firm in Canada. For example, under the
refusal to sell provision, the court may order a Canadian firm which was sup-
plied, to supply the firm which was denied supply by the foreign firm. Cana-
dian firms implementing a directive from a foreign person or firm for the pur-
pose of giving effect to a section 32 conspiracy are subject either to criminal
proceedings or civil proceedings before the RTPC. The implementation by
Canadian firms of foreign directives to give effect to foreign laws is a civil
reviewable matter.
Finally, an examination of the substantive differences between Canada
and the United States reveals that the principal differences of the Canadian
legislation are that the domestic merger provision is ineffective, price fixing is
not illegal per se, and the price discrimination provisions are much weaker.
The provisions on vertical restraints do not appear to be significantly dif-
ferent. Resale price maintenance is illegal in both countries without showing
anticompetitive effects, although in the future it may be analysed under the
rule of reason in the United States. Exclusive dealing and territorial restric-
tions are subject to the same kind of analysis in both countries - under the
rule of reason in the United States and as a civil reviewable matter in Canada,
The Canadian rules on predatory pricing appear to be converging toward those
of the United States. Tied selling may be treated differently. It has been
classified as illegal per se in the United States, while in Canada it must be
shown to have an exclusionary effect.
Currently Canada's competition law on conspiracies and mergers is not a
major factor in a domestic firm's decisions. Canadian firms operating in inter-
national markets are much more concerned about avoiding violations of the
United States and European Economic Community competition law. These
firms rightly assume that if they avoid violations of these two jurisdictions,
they will not have infringed the Combines Investigation Act. Canadian com-
petition law is in need of reform particularly in the area of mergers and
agreements to restrain trade. The courts have failed to develop workable rules
in these two areas and legislative change is necessary. The problem is to design
a competition law that reflects, and is appropriate to, the economic structure
of Canada.
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